24 DOBBSv. JACKSON WOMEN’SHEALTH ORGANIZATION
BREYER,SOTOMAYOR,andKAGAN,JJ.,dissenting
nected to reproductive rights.“The ability of women to par-ticipate equally” in the “life of the Nation”—in all its eco-nomic, social, political, and legal aspects—“has been facili-tatedbytheirabilityto control their reproductive lives.”Id., at 856. Without the ability to decide whether and whento have children, women could not—in the way men took forgranted—determinehowtheywouldlivetheirlives,andhowtheywouldcontributetothesocietyaroundthem.
For much that reason, Casey made clear that the prece-dents Roe most closely tracked were those involving contra-ception.Over the course of three cases, the Court had heldthat a right to use and gain access to contraception was partof the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of liberty.SeeGriswold, 381 U. S. 479; Eisenstadt, 405 U. S. 438; Carey v.Population Services Int’l, 431 U. S. 678 (1977).That clause,we explained, necessarily conferred a right “to be free fromunwarrantedgovernmentalintrusionintomatterssofun-damentallyaffectingapersonasthedecisionwhethertobearorbegetachild.”Eisenstadt,405U. S.,at 453; seeCarey,431U.S.,at684–685.CaseysawRoeasofapiece:In“criticalrespectstheabortiondecisionisofthesamecharacter.”505U. S.,at852.“[R]easonablepeople,” theCourt noted, could also oppose contraception; and indeed,they could believe that “some forms of contraception” simi-larly implicate a concern with “potential life.” Id., at 853,859.Yet the views of others could not automatically prevailagainst a woman’s right to control her own body and makeherownchoiceaboutwhethertobear,andprobably toraise, a child.When an unplanned pregnancy is involved—because either contraception or abortion is outlawed—“theliberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to thehuman condition.”Id., at 852.No State could undertake toresolvethemoralquestionsraised“in such a definitiveway”astodepriveawomanofallchoice.Id.,at850.
FacedwithalltheseconnectionsbetweenRoe/Caseyand
jud
