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tripnotto“NewYork[or]California”buttoToronto.Ante,at4(KAVANAUGH,J.,concurring).
Whatever the exact scope of the coming laws, one resultof today’s decision is certain: the curtailment of women’srights, and of their status as free and equal citizens.Yes-terday, the Constitution guaranteed that a woman con-fronted with an unplanned pregnancy could (within reason-able limits) make her own decision about whether to bear achild, with all the life-transforming consequences that actinvolves.And in thus safeguarding each woman’s reproduc-tive freedom, the Constitution also protected “[t]he abilityof women to participate equally in [this Nation’s] economicand social life.”Casey, 505 U. S., at 856.But no longer. Asof today, this Court holds, a State can always force a womanto give birth, prohibiting even the earliest abortions.AState can thus transform what, when freely undertaken, isa wonder into what, when forced, may be a nightmare.Some women, especially women of means, will find waysaround the State’s assertion of power.Others—those with-out money or childcare or the ability to take time off fromwork—will not be so fortunate. Maybe they will try an un-safe method of abortion, and come to physical harm, or evendie.Maybe they will undergo pregnancy and have a child,but at significant personal or familial cost.At the least,they will incur the cost of losing control of their lives.TheConstitutionwill,today’smajorityholds,providenoshield,despiteitsguaranteesoflibertyandequalityforall.
Andnooneshouldbeconfidentthatthismajorityisdone
withitswork.TherightRoeandCaseyrecognizeddoesnotstand alone.To the contrary, the Court has linked it fordecades to other settled freedoms involving bodily integrity,familial relationships, and procreation.Most obviously, theright to terminate a pregnancy arose straight out of theright to purchase and use contraception.See Griswold v.Connecticut,381U.S.479(1965);Eisenstadtv.Baird,405
U.S.438(1972). Inturn,thoserightsled,morerecently,
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torightsofsame-sexintimacyandmarriage. SeeLawrence
v.Texas,539U. S.558(2003);Obergefellv.Hodges,576
U. S. 644 (2015). They are all part of the same constitu-tionalfabric,protectingautonomousdecisionmakingoverthe most personal of life decisions.The majority (or to bemore accurate, most of it) is eager to tell us today that noth-ing it does “cast[s] doubt on precedents that do not concernabortion.”Ante, at 66; cf. ante, at 3 (THOMAS, J., concurring)(advocatingtheoverrulingofGriswold,Lawrence,andObergefell).But how could that be?The lone rationale forwhat the majority does today is that the right to elect anabortion is not “deeply rooted in history”: Not until Roe, themajorityargues,didpeoplethinkabortionfellwithintheConstitution’s guarantee of liberty.Ante, at 32.The samecouldbesaid,though,ofmostoftherightsthemajorityclaims it is not tampering with. The majority could writejust as long an opinion showing, for example, that until themid-20thcentury,“therewasnosupportinAmericanlawforaconstitutionalrighttoobtain[contraceptives].”Ante,at 15. So one of two things must be true. Either the major-ity does not really believe in its own reasoning.Or if it does,all rights that have no history stretching back to the mid-19th century are insecure.Either the mass of the majority’sopinion is hypocrisy, or additional constitutional rights areunderthreat.Itisoneortheother.
Onepieceofevidenceonthatscoreseemsespeciallysa-
lient: The majority’s cavalier approach to overturning thisCourt’s precedents.Stare decisis is the Latin phrase for afoundationstoneoftheruleoflaw:thatthingsdecidedshould stay decided unless there is a very good reason forchange.It is a doctrine of judicial modesty and humility.Those qualities are not evident in today’s opinion.The ma-jority has no good reason for the upheaval in law and societyit sets off.Roe and Casey have been the law of the land fordecades,shapingwomen’sexpectationsoftheirchoiceswhenanunplannedpregnancyoccurs. Womenhaverelied
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on the availability of abortion both in structuring their re-lationshipsandinplanningtheirlives.The legal frame-work Roe and Casey developed to balance the competing in-terests in this sphere has proved workable in courts acrossthe country.No recent developments, in either law or fact,have eroded or cast doubt on those precedents.Nothing, inshort,haschanged.Indeed,theCourt in Casey alreadyfound all of that to be true.Casey is a precedent about prec-edent.It reviewed the same arguments made here in sup-port of overruling Roe, and it found that doing so was notwarranted.The Court reverses course today for one reasonand one reason only: because the composition of this Courthas changed.Stare decisis, this Court has often said, “con-tributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicialprocess” by ensuring that decisions are “founded in the lawrather than in the proclivities of individuals.”Payne v. Ten-nessee,501U.S.808,827(1991);Vasquezv.Hillery,474
U.S.254,265(1986).Today,theproclivitiesofindividuals
rule.TheCourtdepartsfromitsobligationtofaithfullyandimpartiallyapplythelaw.Wedissent.
I
WestartwithRoeandCasey,andwiththeirdeepconnec-tions to a broad swath of this Court’s precedents.To hearthe majority tell the tale, Roe and Casey are aberrations:They came from nowhere, went nowhere—and so are easyto excise from this Nation’s constitutional law.That is nottrue.Afterdescribingthedecisionsthemselves,weexplainhowtheyarerootedin—andthemselves ledto—otherrightsgivingindividualscontrolovertheirbodiesandtheirmost personal and intimate associations.The majority doesnot wish to talk about these matters for obvious reasons; todo so would both ground Roe and Casey in this Court’s prec-edents and reveal the broad implications of today’s decision.But the facts will not so handily disappear.Roe and Caseywerefromthebeginning,andareevenmorenow,embedded
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in core constitutional concepts of individual freedom, and ofthe equal rights of citizens to decide on the shape of theirlives. Those legal concepts, one might even say, have gonefar toward defining what it means to be an American.Forin this Nation, we do not believe that a government control-lingallprivatechoicesiscompatiblewithafreepeople.Sowe do not (as the majority insists today) place everythingwithin “the reach of majorities and [government] officials.”West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette,319 U. S. 624, 638(1943). We believe in a Constitution that puts some issuesoff limits to majority rule.Even in the face of public oppo-sition, we uphold the right of individuals—yes, includingwomen—to make their own choices and chart their own fu-tures.Oratleast,wedidonce.
A
Some half-century ago, Roe struck down a state law mak-ing it a crime to perform an abortion unless its purpose wasto save a woman’s life.The Roe Court knew it was treadingon difficult and disputed ground.It understood that differ-ent people’s “experiences,” “values,” and “religious training”and beliefs led to “opposing views” about abortion. 410
U. S., at 116. But by a 7-to-2 vote, the Court held that intheearlierstagesofpregnancy,thatcontestedandcontest-able choice must belong to a woman, in consultation withherfamilyanddoctor.TheCourtexplainedthatalonglineof precedents, “founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’sconceptofpersonalliberty,”protectedindividualdeci-sionmaking related to “marriage, procreation, contracep-tion, family relationships, and child rearing and education.”Id., at 152–153 (citations omitted).For the same reasons,the Court held, the Constitution must protect “a woman’sdecision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”Id.,at 153.The Court recognized the myriad ways bearing achildcanalterthe“lifeandfuture”ofawomanandother
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members of her family.Ibid.A State could not, “by adopt-ing one theory of life,” override all “rights of the pregnantwoman.”Id.,at162.
Atthesametime,though,theCourtrecognized“validin-terest[s]”oftheState“inregulatingtheabortiondecision.”Id., at 153. The Court noted in particular “important inter-ests” in “protecting potential life,” “maintaining medicalstandards,” and “safeguarding [the] health” of the woman.Id., at 154.No “absolut[ist]” account of the woman’s rightcouldwipeawaythosesignificantstateclaims.Ibid.
TheCourtthereforestruckabalance,turningonthestage ofthepregnancyat whichtheabortion wouldoccur.TheCourtexplainedthatearlyon,awoman’schoicemustprevail,butthat“atsomepointthestateinterests”become“dominant.”Id.,at155.Itthensetsomeguideposts.Inthefirsttrimesterofpregnancy,theStatecouldnotinter-fereatallwiththedecisiontoterminateapregnancy.Atanytimeafterthatpoint,theStatecouldregulatetoprotectthepregnantwoman’shealth,suchasbyinsistingthatabortionprovidersandfacilitiesmeetsafetyrequirements.Andafterthefetus’sviability—thepointwhenthefetus“hasthecapabilityofmeaningfullifeoutsidethemother’swomb”—theStatecouldbanabortions,exceptwhenneces-sarytopreservethewoman’slifeorhealth.Id.,at163–164.Inthe20yearsbetweenRoeand Casey,theCourtex-pressly reaffirmed Roe on two occasions, and applied it onmanymore. Recognizingthat“arguments[againstRoe]continuetobemade,”werespondedthatthedoctrineofstaredecisis“demandsrespectinasocietygovernedbytherule of law.” Akronv.AkronCenterforReproductiveHealth,Inc.,462U.S.416,419–420(1983).Andweavowedthatthe“vitality”of“constitutionalprinciplescannotbeal-lowedtoyieldsimplybecauseofdisagreementwiththem.”Thornburghv.AmericanCollegeofObstetriciansandGyne-cologists,476U.S.747,759(1986).SotheCourt,overand
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over, enforced the constitutional principles Roe had de-clared.See,e.g.,Ohiov.AkronCenterforReproductiveHealth,497U.S.502(1990);Hodgsonv.Minnesota,497
U. S. 417 (1990); Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U. S. 506(1983);PlannedParenthoodAssn.ofKansasCity,Mo.,Inc.
v.Ashcroft,462U.S.476(1983);H.L.v.Matheson,450U. S. 398 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622 (1979);PlannedParenthoodofCentralMo.v.Danforth,428U.S.52(1976).
Then, in Casey, the Court considered the matter anew,and again upheld Roe’s core precepts.Casey is in signifi-cant measure a precedent about the doctrine of precedent—until today, one of the Court’s most important.But weleave for later that aspect of the Court’s decision.The keything now is the substantive aspect of the Court’s consid-ered conclusion that “the essential holding of Roe v. Wadeshould be retained and once again reaffirmed.”505 U. S.,at846.
Centraltothatconclusionwasafull-throated restate-mentofawoman’srighttochoose.Like Roe, Caseygrounded that right in the Fourteenth Amendment’s guar-antee of “liberty.”That guarantee encompasses realms ofconductnotspecificallyreferencedintheConstitution:“Marriage is mentioned nowhere” in that document, yet theCourtwas“nodoubtcorrect”toprotectthefreedomtomarry “against state interference.” 505 U. S., at 847–848.Andtheguaranteeoflibertyencompassesconduct todaythatwasnotprotectedatthetimeoftheFourteenthAmendment.See id., at 848.“It is settled now,” the Courtsaid—though it was not always so—that “the Constitutionplaces limits on a State’s right to interfere with a person’smostbasicdecisionsaboutfamilyandparenthood,aswellasbodilyintegrity.”Id.,at849(citationsomitted);seeid.,at851(similarlydescribingtheconstitutionalprotectiongiven to “personal decisions relating to marriage, procrea-tion,contraception,[and]familyrelationships”).Especially
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important in this web of precedents protecting an individ-ual’s most “personal choices” were those guaranteeing theright to contraception.Ibid.; see id., at 852–853.In thosecases, the Court had recognized “the right of the individual”to make the vastly consequential “decision whether to bear”a child.Id., at 851 (emphasis deleted).So too, Casey rea-soned, the liberty clause protects the decision of a womanconfronting an unplanned pregnancy.Her decision aboutabortion was central, in the same way, to her capacity tochartherlife’scourse.Seeid.,at853.
InreaffirmingtherightRoerecognized, the Court tookfull account of the diversity of views on abortion, and theimportanceofvariouscompetingstateinterests.SomeAmericans,theCourtstated, “deem [abortion] nothingshortofanactofviolenceagainstinnocenthumanlife.” 505
U. S., at 852.And each State has an interest in “the protec-tion of potential life”—as Roe itself had recognized. 505
U. S., at 871 (plurality opinion).On the one hand, that in-terest was not conclusive.The State could not “resolve” the“moralandspiritual”questionsraisedbyabortionin“sucha definitive way that a woman lacks all choice in the mat-ter.”Id., at 850 (majority opinion).It could not force her tobear the “pain” and “physical constraints” of “carr[ying] achildtofullterm”whenshewouldhavechosenanearlyabortion. Id., at 852. But on the other hand, the State had,as Roe had held, an exceptionally significant interest in dis-allowingabortionsinthelaterphaseofapregnancy.Andithadanever-presentinterestin“ensur[ing]thatthewoman’s choice is informed” and in presenting the case for“choos[ing] childbirth over abortion.”505 U. S., at 878 (plu-ralityopinion).
SoCaseyagainstruckabalance,differingfromRoe’sin
only incremental ways.It retained Roe’s “central holding”thattheStatecouldbarabortiononlyafterviability. 505
U.S.,at860(majorityopinion). Theviabilityline,Casey
thought,was“moreworkable”thananyotherinmarking
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theplacewherethewoman’slibertyinterestgavewaytoaState’s efforts to preserve potential life. Id., at 870 (plural-ity opinion).At that point, a “second life” was capable of“independent existence.”Ibid.If the woman even by thenhad not acted, she lacked adequate grounds to object to “theState’sinterventionon[thedevelopingchild’s]behalf.”Ibid.At the same time, Casey decided, based on two dec-ades of experience, that the Roe framework did not giveStatessufficientabilitytoregulateabortionpriortoviabil-ity.In that period, Casey now made clear, the State couldregulatenotonlytoprotectthewoman’shealthbutalsoto“promot[e] prenatal life.”505 U. S., at 873 (plurality opin-ion).In particular, the State could ensure informed choiceand could try to promote childbirth.See id., at 877–878.But the State still could not place an “undue burden”—or“substantialobstacle”—“inthepathofawomanseekinganabortion.”Id., at 878.Prior to viability, the woman, con-sistent with the constitutional “meaning of liberty,” must“retain the ultimate control over her destiny and her body.”Id.,at869.
Wemakeoneinitialpointaboutthisanalysisinlightof
the majority’s insistence that Roe and Casey, and we in de-fending them, are dismissive of a “State’s interest in pro-tecting prenatal life.”Ante, at 38.Nothing could get thosedecisionsmorewrong.Asjustdescribed,RoeandCaseyin-voked powerful state interests in that protection, operativeat every stage of the pregnancy and overriding the woman’sliberty after viability. The strength of those state interestsis exactly why the Court allowed greater restrictions on theabortionrightthanonotherrightsderivingfromtheFour-teenth Amendment.1But what Roe and Casey also recog-nized—whichtoday’smajoritydoesnot—isthatawoman’s
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1 For this reason, we do not understand the majority’s view that ouranalogy between the right to an abortion and the rights to contraceptionand same-sex marriage shows that we think “[t]he Constitution does notpermittheStatestoregardthedestructionofa‘potentiallife’asamatter
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freedomandequalityarelikewiseinvolved.Thatfact—thepresence of countervailing interests—is what made theabortion question hard, and what necessitated balancing.The majority scoffs at that idea, castigating us for “repeat-edlyprais[ing]the‘balance’”thetwocasesarrivedat(withthe word “balance” in scare quotes).Ante, at 38.To themajority “balance” is a dirty word, as moderation is a for-eignconcept.ThemajoritywouldallowStatestobanabor-tion from conception onward because it does not thinkforced childbirth at all implicates a woman’s rights to equal-ity and freedom.Today’s Court, that is, does not thinkthere is anything of constitutional significance attached toa woman’s control of her body and the path of her life. RoeandCaseythoughtthatone-sidedviewmisguided.Insomesense,thatisthedifferenceinanutshellbetweenourprec-edents and the majority opinion.The constitutional regimewehavelivedinforthelast50yearsrecognizedcompetinginterests, and sought a balance between them. The consti-tutional regime we enter today erases the woman’s interestand recognizes only the State’s (or the Federal Govern-ment’s).
B
Themajoritymakesthischangebasedonasingleques-tion:DidthereproductiverightrecognizedinRoeandCasey
——————
of any significance.”Ante, at 38.To the contrary.The liberty interestsunderlying those rights are, as we will describe, quite similar. See infra,at 22–24.But only in the sphere of abortion is the state interest in pro-tecting potential life involved.So only in that sphere, as both Roe andCaseyrecognized,mayaStateimpingesofaronthelibertyinterest(bar-ring abortion after viability and discouraging it before).The majority’sfailuretounderstandthisfairlyobviouspointstemsfromitsrejectionofthe idea of balancing interests in this (or maybe in any) constitutionalcontext.Cf.NewYorkStateRifle&PistolAssn.,Inc.v.Bruen,597U.S.
,,–(2022)(slipop.,at8,15–17). Themajoritythinksthata woman has no liberty or equality interest in the decision to bear a child,soaState’sinterestinprotectingfetallifenecessarilyprevails.
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exist in “1868, the year when the Fourteenth Amendmentwas ratified”? Ante, at 23. The majority says (and with thismuch we agree) that the answer to this question is no: In1868, there was no nationwide right to end a pregnancy,and no thought that the Fourteenth Amendment providedone.
Ofcourse,themajorityopinionrefersaswell to somelater and earlier history. On the one side of 1868, it goesback as far as the 13th (the 13th!) century.See ante, at 17.Butthatturnsouttobe wheel-spinning. First, it is notclearwhatrelevancesuchearlyhistoryshouldhave,eventothemajority. See New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn.,Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S.,(2022) (slip op., at 26) (“His-torical evidence that long predates [ratification] may not il-luminate the scope of the right”).If the early history obvi-ouslysupportedabortionrights,themajoritywouldnodoubtsaythatonlytheviewsoftheFourteenthAmend-ment’sratifiersaregermane.Seeibid.(Itis“betternottogo too far back into antiquity,” except if olden “law survivedto become our Founders’ law”).Second—and embarrass-ingly for the majority—early law in fact does provide somesupportforabortionrights.Common-law authorities didnot treat abortion as a crime before “quickening”—the pointwhen the fetus moved in the womb.2 And early Americanlaw followed the common-law rule.3So the criminal law ofthatearlytimemightbetakenasroughlyconsonantwith
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2 See, e.g., 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England129–130 (7th ed. 1775) (Blackstone); E. Coke, Institutes of the Laws ofEngland50(1644).
3 See J. Mohr, Abortion in America: The Origins and Evolution of Na-tional Policy, 1800–1900, pp. 3–4 (1978). The majority offers no evidencetothecontrary—noexampleofafounding-eralawmakingpre-quickening abortion a crime (except when a woman died).See ante, at20–21.And even in the mid-19th century, more than 10 States continuedto allow pre-quickening abortions.See Brief for American Historical As-sociationetal.asAmiciCuriae27,andn.14.
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Roe’s and Casey’s different treatment of early and late abor-tions.Better, then, to move forward in time. On the othersideof1868,themajorityoccasionallynotesthatmanyStatesbarredabortionuptothetimeofRoe.Seeante,at24, 36.That is convenient for the majority, but it is windowdressing.As the same majority (plus one) just informed us,“post-ratification adoption or acceptance of laws that are in-consistentwiththeoriginalmeaningofthe constitutionaltextobviouslycannotovercomeoralter that text.” NewYork State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc., 597 U. S., at –(slip op., at 27–28).Had the pre-Roe liberalization of abor-tionlawsoccurredmorequicklyandmorewidelyin the20th century, the majority would say (once again) that onlytheratifiers’viewsaregermane.
Themajority’scorelegalpostulate,then,isthatweinthe
21stcenturymustreadtheFourteenthAmendmentjustasits ratifiers did.And that is indeed what the majority em-phasizesoverandoveragain.Seeante,at47(“[T]hemostimportant historical fact [is] how the States regulated abor-tion when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted”); seealso ante, at 5, 16, and n. 24, 23, 25, 28.If the ratifiers didnotunderstandsomethingascentraltofreedom,thennei-thercanwe.Orsaidmoreparticularly:Ifthosepeopledidnot understand reproductive rights as part of the guaranteeof liberty conferred in the Fourteenth Amendment, thenthoserightsdonotexist.
As an initial matter, note a mistake in the just precedingsentence.We referred there to the “people” who ratified theFourteenthAmendment:Whatrightsdidthose “people”have in their heads at the time?But, of course, “people” didnot ratify the Fourteenth Amendment.Men did.Soit isperhaps not so surprising that the ratifiers were not per-fectly attuned to the importance of reproductive rights forwomen’s liberty, or for their capacity to participate as equalmembers of our Nation.Indeed, the ratifiers—both in 1868andwhentheoriginalConstitutionwasapprovedin1788—
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did not understand women as full members of the commu-nity embraced by the phrase “We the People.”In 1868, thefirstwaveofAmericanfeministswereexplicitlytold—ofcourse by men—that it was not their time to seek constitu-tional protections.(Women would not get even the vote foranother half-century.)To be sure, most women in 1868 alsohad a foreshortened view of their rights: If most men couldnot then imagine giving women control over their bodies,most women could not imagine having that kind of auton-omy.Butthattakesawaynothingfrom the core point.Thoseresponsiblefortheoriginal Constitution, includingtheFourteenthAmendment,didnotperceivewomenasequals,anddidnotrecognizewomen’srights.Whenthemajoritysaysthatwemustreadourfoundationalcharterasviewedatthetimeofratification(exceptthatwemayalso check it against the Dark Ages), it consigns women tosecond-classcitizenship.
Caseyitselfunderstoodthispoint,aswillbecomeclear.
See infra, at 23–24.It recollected with dismay a decisionthisCourtissuedjustfiveyearsaftertheFourteenthAmendment’s ratification, approving a State’s decision todeny a law license to a woman and suggesting as well thata woman had no legal status apart from her husband.See505U.S.,at896–897(majorityopinion)(citingBradwellv.State, 16 Wall. 130 (1873)).“There was a time,” Casey ex-plained, when the Constitution did not protect “men andwomen alike.” 505 U. S., at 896. But times had changed.A woman’s place in society had changed, and constitutionallawhadchangedalongwithit.Therelegationofwomentoinferiorstatusineitherthepublicsphereorthefamilywas“no longer consistent with our understanding” of the Con-stitution.Id., at 897.Now, “[t]he Constitution protects allindividuals, male or female,” from “the abuse of governmen-tal power” or “unjustified state interference.”Id., at 896,898.
Sohowisitthat,asCaseysaid,ourConstitution,read
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now, grants rights to women, though it did not in 1868?HowisitthatourConstitutionsubjectsdiscriminationagainstthemtoheightenedjudicialscrutiny?Howisitthatour Constitution, through the Fourteenth Amendment’s lib-erty clause, guarantees access to contraception (also not le-gally protected in 1868) so that women can decide for them-selves whether and when to bear a child?How is it thatuntil today, that same constitutional clause protected awoman’s right, in the event contraception failed, to end apregnancyinitsearlierstages?
The answer is that this Court has rejected the majority’spinched view of how to read our Constitution.“The Found-ers,” we recently wrote, “knew they were writing a docu-mentdesignedtoapplyto ever-changing circumstancesovercenturies.”NLRBv.NoelCanning,573U. S.513,533–534 (2014).Or in the words of the great Chief JusticeJohn Marshall, our Constitution is “intended to endure foragestocome,”andmustadaptitselfto a future “seendimly,” if at all.McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 415(1819).That is indeed why our Constitution is written as itis. The Framers (both in 1788 and 1868) understood thatthe world changes.So they did not define rights by refer-ence to the specific practices existing at the time. Instead,the Framers defined rights in general terms, to permit fu-ture evolution in their scope and meaning.And over thecourse of our history, this Court has taken up the Framers’invitation.IthaskepttruetotheFramers’principlesbyapplying them in new ways, responsive to new societal un-derstandingsandconditions.
Nowherehasthatapproachbeenmoreprevalentthanin
construing the majestic but open-ended words of the Four-teenthAmendment—theguaranteesof“liberty”and“equality” for all.And nowhere has that approach producedprouder moments, for this country and the Court.Consideran example Obergefell used a few years ago. The Court
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thereconfrontedaclaim,basedonWashingtonv.Glucks-berg, 521 U. S. 702 (1997), that the Fourteenth Amendment“must be defined in a most circumscribed manner, with cen-tral reference to specific historical practices”—exactly theview today’s majority follows.Obergefell, 576 U. S., at 671.And the Court specifically rejected that view.4 In doing so,the Court reflected on what the proposed, historically cir-cumscribedapproachwouldhavemeantforinterracialmarriage.See ibid. The Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifiersdid not think it gave black and white people a right to marryeachother.Tothecontrary,contemporaneouspracticedeemed that act quite as unprotected as abortion.Yet theCourtinLovingv.Virginia,388U. S.1(1967),readtheFourteenth Amendment to embrace the Lovings’ union.If,Obergefell explained, “rights were defined by who exercisedtheminthepast,thenreceivedpracticescould serve astheir own continued justification”—even when they conflictwith “liberty” and “equality” as later and more broadly un-derstood.576U. S.,at671. The Constitution does notfreezeforalltimetheoriginalviewofwhatthoserightsguarantee,orhowtheyapply.
Thatdoesnotmeananythinggoes. Themajoritywishes
people to think there are but two alternatives: (1) accept theoriginal applications of the Fourteenth Amendment and noothers, or (2) surrender to judges’ “own ardent views,” un-grounded in law, about the “liberty that Americans shouldenjoy.”Ante, at 14.At least, that idea is what the majoritysometimes tries to convey.At other times, the majority (or,rather, most of it) tries to assure the public that it has nodesigns on rights (for example, to contraception) that aroseonlyinthebackhalfofthe20thcentury—inotherwords,
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4 The majority ignores that rejection.See ante, at 5, 13, 36.But it isunequivocal: The Glucksberg test, Obergefell said, “may have been ap-propriate”inconsideringphysician-assistedsuicide,but“isinconsistentwith the approach this Court has used in discussing other fundamentalrights,includingmarriageandintimacy.”576U.S.,at671.
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that it is happy to pick and choose, in accord with individualpreferences.Seeante,at32,66,71–72;ante,at10(KAVANAUGH,J.,concurring);butseeante,at3(THOMAS,J., concurring).But that is a matter we discuss later.Seeinfra, at 24–29.For now, our point is different: It is thatapplications of liberty and equality can evolve while re-maining grounded in constitutional principles, constitu-tional history, and constitutional precedents.The secondJustice Harlan discussed how to strike the right balancewhen he explained why he would have invalidated a State’sban on contraceptive use.Judges, he said, are not “free toroam where unguided speculation might take them.”Poe v.Ullman,367U.S.497,542(1961)(dissentingopinion).Yettheyalsomustrecognizethattheconstitutional“tradition”of this country is not captured whole at a single moment.Ibid.Rather,itsmeaninggainscontentfromthelongsweep of our history and from successive judicial prece-dents—each looking to the last and each seeking to applytheConstitution’smostfundamentalcommitmentstonewconditions.That is why Americans, to go back to Oberge-fell’s example, have a right to marry across racial lines.And it is why, to go back to Justice Harlan’s case, Ameri-cans have a right to use contraceptives so they can chooseforthemselveswhethertohavechildren.
AllthatiswhatCaseyunderstood. Caseyexplicitlyre-
jected the present majority’s method.“[T]he specific prac-tices of States at the time of the adoption of the FourteenthAmendment,” Casey stated, do not “mark[ ] the outer limitsof the substantive sphere of liberty which the FourteenthAmendment protects.”505 U. S., at 848.5To hold other-wise—asthemajoritydoestoday—“wouldbeinconsistent
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5Inaperplexingparagraphinitsopinion,themajoritydeclaresthatitneednotsaywhetherthatstatementfromCaseyistrue.Seeante,at32–
33.Buthowcouldthatbe?Hasnotthemajorityinsistedfortheprior30orsopagesthatthe“specificpractice[]”respectingabortionatthe
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with our law.”Id., at 847.Why?Because the Court has“vindicated[the]principle”overandoverthat(nomatterthe sentiment in 1868) “there is a realm of personal libertywhichthegovernmentmaynotenter”—especiallyrelatingto “bodily integrity” and “family life.”Id., at 847, 849, 851.CaseydescribedindetailtheCourt’s contraception cases.See id., at 848–849, 851–853.It noted decisions protectingtherighttomarry,includingtosomeone of another race.Seeid.,at847–848(“[I]nterracialmarriagewasillegalinmost States in the 19th century, but the Court was no doubtcorrectinfindingittobeanaspectoflibertyprotectedagainst state interference”).In reviewing decades and dec-ades of constitutional law, Casey could draw but one conclu-sion: Whatever was true in 1868, “[i]t is settled now, as itwaswhentheCourtheardargumentsinRoev.Wade,thatthe Constitution places limits on a State’s right to interferewithaperson’smostbasicdecisionsaboutfamilyandparenthood.”Id.,at849.
Andthatconclusionstillheldgood,untiltheCourt’sin-
terventionhere.ItwassettledatthetimeofRoe,settledatthe time of Casey, and settled yesterday that the Constitu-tion places limits on a State’s power to assert control overan individual’s body and most personal decisionmaking. Amultitude of decisions supporting that principle led to Roe’srecognition and Casey’s reaffirmation of the right to choose;and Roe and Casey in turn supported additional protectionsforintimateandfamilialrelations. Themajorityhasem-
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time of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes its recognition as a consti-tutional right?Ante, at 33.It has. And indeed, it has given no otherreason for overruling Roe and Casey.Ante, at 15–16.We are not min-dreaders,but hereis ourbest guess as to what the majority means.Itsaysnextthat“[a]bortionisnothingnew.”Ante,at33.Soapparently,the Fourteenth Amendment might provide protection for things whollyunknown in the 19th century; maybe one day there could be constitu-tional protection for, oh, time travel.But as to anything that was knownbackthen(suchasabortionorcontraception),nosuchluck.
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barrassingly little to say about those precedents.It (liter-ally) rattles them off in a single paragraph; and it impliesthat they have nothing to do with each other, or with theright to terminate an early pregnancy.See ante, at 31–32(asserting that recognizing a relationship among them, asaddressing aspects of personal autonomy, would inelucta-bly “license fundamental rights” to illegal “drug use [and]prostitution”).But that is flat wrong.The Court’s prece-dentsaboutbodilyautonomy,sexualandfamilialrelations,and procreation are all interwoven—all part of the fabric ofour constitutional law, and because that is so, of our lives.Especially women’s lives, where they safeguard a right toself-determination.
Andeliminatingthatright,weneedtosaybeforefurther
describing our precedents, is not taking a “neutral” posi-tion,asJUSTICEKAVANAUGHtriestoargue. Ante,at2–3,5,7,11–12(concurringopinion).Hisideaisthatneutralitylies in giving the abortion issue to the States, where somecan go one way and some another.But would he say thatthe Court is being “scrupulously neutral” if it allowed NewYorkandCaliforniatobanallthegunstheywant?Ante,at
3.If the Court allowed some States to use unanimous juriesand others not?If the Court told the States: Decide foryourselves whether to put restrictions on church attend-ance?Wecouldgoon—andinfactwewill.SupposeJUSTICE KAVANAUGH were to say (in line with the majorityopinion)thattherightswejustlistedaremoretextuallyorhistoricallygroundedthantherighttochoose.What,then,oftherighttocontraceptionorsame-sexmarriage?Wouldit be “scrupulously neutral” for the Court to eliminate thoserights too?The point of all these examples is that when itcomes to rights, the Court does not act “neutrally” when itleaves everything up to the States.Rather, the Court actsneutrally when it protects the right against all comers. Andto apply that point to the case here: When the Court deci-matesarightwomenhaveheldfor50years,theCourtis
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not being “scrupulously neutral.” It is instead taking sides:against women who wish to exercise the right, and forStates (like Mississippi) that want to bar them from doingso.JUSTICE KAVANAUGH cannot obscure that point by ap-propriating the rhetoric of even-handedness.His positionjustiswhatitis:Abrook-no-compromiserefusaltorecog-nizeawoman’srighttochoose,fromthefirstdayofapreg-nancy.And that position, as we will now show, cannot besquared with this Court’s longstanding view that womenindeed have rights (whatever the state of the world in 1868)to make the most personal and consequential decisionsabouttheirbodiesandtheirlives.
Considerfirst,then,thelineofthisCourt’scasesprotect-
ing “bodily integrity.”Casey, 505 U. S., at 849. “No right,”inthisCourt’stime-honoredview,“isheldmoresacred,orismorecarefullyguarded,”than“therightofeveryindivid-ualtothepossessionandcontrolofhisownperson.”UnionPacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250, 251 (1891); seeCruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U. S. 261, 269(1990)(Everyadult“hasarighttodeterminewhatshallbedonewithhisownbody”).Ortoputitmoresimply:Every-one, including women, owns their own bodies.So the Courthasrestrictedthepowerofgovernmenttointerferewithaperson’smedicaldecisionsorcompelhertoundergomedicalproceduresortreatments. See,e.g.,Winstonv.Lee,470
U.S.753,766–767(1985) (forcedsurgery);Rochin v.Cali-
fornia,342U.S.165,166,173–174(1952)(forcedstomach
pumping); Washington v. Harper, 494 U. S. 210, 229, 236(1990)(forcedadministrationofantipsychoticdrugs).
Caseyrecognizedthe“doctrinalaffinity”betweenthoseprecedents and Roe.505 U. S., at 857.And that doctrinalaffinity is born of a factual likeness.There are few greaterincursions on a body than forcing a woman to complete apregnancy and give birth.For every woman, those experi-ences involve all manner of physical changes, medical treat-ments(includingthepossibilityofacesareansection),and
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medicalrisk.Justasoneexample,anAmericanwomanis14 times more likely to die by carrying a pregnancy to termthan by having an abortion.See Whole Woman’s Health v.Hellerstedt, 579 U. S. 582, 618 (2016).That women happilyundergothoseburdensandhazardsoftheirown accorddoes not lessen how far a State impinges on a woman’s bodywhen it compels her to bring a pregnancy to term.And forsomewomen,asRoerecognized,abortionsaremedicallynecessary to prevent harm.See 410 U. S., at 153.The ma-joritydoesnotsay—whichisitselfominous—whetheraStatemaypreventawomanfromobtaininganabortionwhen she and her doctor have determined it is a neededmedicaltreatment.
Sotoo,RoeandCaseyfitneatlyintoalonglineofdeci-
sions protecting from government intrusion a wealth of pri-vate choices about family matters, child rearing, intimaterelationships,andprocreation.SeeCasey,505U.S.,at851,857; Roe, 410 U. S., at 152–153; see also ante, at 31–32 (list-ing the myriad decisions of this kind that Casey relied on).Those cases safeguard particular choices about whom tomarry; whom to have sex with; what family members to livewith; how to raise children—and crucially, whether andwhen to have children.In varied cases, the Court explainedthat those choices—“the most intimate and personal” a per-son can make—reflect fundamental aspects of personalidentity; they define the very “attributes of personhood.”Casey, 505 U. S., at 851.And they inevitably shape the na-tureandfuturecourseofaperson’slife(andoftenthelivesof those closest to her).So, the Court held, those choicesbelong to the individual, and not the government.That istheessenceofwhatlibertyrequires.
Andlibertymayrequireit,thisCourthasrepeatedly
said, even when those living in 1868 would not have recog-nized the claim—because they would not have seen the per-son making it as a full-fledged member of the community.Throughoutourhistory,thesphereofprotectedlibertyhas
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expanded, bringing in individuals formerly excluded.Inthat way, the constitutional values of liberty and equalitygo hand in hand; they do not inhabit the hermetically sealedcontainersthemajorityportrays.CompareObergefell,576
U. S., at 672–675, with ante, at 10–11.So before Roe andCasey, the Court expanded in successive cases those whocouldclaimtherighttomarry—thoughtheirrelationshipswould have been outside the law’s protection in the mid-19th century.See, e.g., Loving, 388 U. S. 1 (interracial cou-ples); Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78 (1987) (prisoners); seealso, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651–652 (1972)(offeringconstitutionalprotectiontountraditional“familyunit[s]”).AndafterRoeandCasey,ofcourse,theCourtcon-tinued in that vein.With a critical stop to hold that theFourteenth Amendment protected same-sex intimacy, theCourtresolvedthattheAmendmentalsoconferredonsame-sexcouplestherighttomarry. SeeLawrence,539
U.S.558;Obergefell,576U.S.644. Inconsideringthat
question, the Court held, “[h]istory and tradition,” espe-cially as reflected in the course of our precedent, “guide anddiscipline [the] inquiry.”Id., at 664.But the sentiments of1868alonedonotand cannot “rule the present.”Ibid.
Caseysimilarlyrecognizedtheneedtoextendtheconsti-tutional sphere of liberty to a previously excluded group.TheCourtthenunderstood,asthemajoritytodaydoesnot,thatthemenwhoratifiedtheFourteenthAmendmentandwrotethestatelawsofthetimedidnotviewwomenasfulland equal citizens.See supra, at 15.A woman then, Caseywrote,“hadnolegalexistenceseparatefromherhusband.”505 U. S., at 897.Women were seen only “as the center ofhome and family life,” without “full and independent legalstatus under the Constitution.”Ibid.But that could not betrue any longer: The State could not now insist on the his-toricallydominant“visionofthewoman’srole.”Id.,at852.Andequalcitizenship,Caseyrealized,wasinescapablycon-
