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cause the death of such person, and being thereof dulyconvicted, shall be punished by confinement in the pen-itentiary for a term not less than one year and not morethan seven years.And every person who shall admin-isterorcausetobeadministeredortaken,anysuchpoison, substance or liquid, with the intention to pro-curethemiscarriageofanywomanthen being withchild, and shall thereof be duly convicted, shall be im-prisoned for a term not exceeding three years in thepenitentiary,andfinedinasumnotexceedingonethousanddollars.”95 26.Maryland(1868):Sec. 2.“And be it enacted, That any person who shallknowingly advertise, print, publish, distribute or circu-late, or knowingly cause to be advertised, printed, pub-lished, distributed or circulated, any pamphlet, printedpaper, book, newspaper notice, advertisement or refer-ence containing words or language, giving or conveyingany notice, hint or reference to any person, or to thename of any person real or fictitious, from whom; or toany place, house, shop or office, when any poison, drug,mixture, preparation, medicine or noxious thing, or anyinstrument or means whatever; for the purpose of pro-ducingabortion,orwhoshallknowinglysell,orcauseto be sold any such poison, drug, mixture, preparation,medicineor noxiousthingorinstrumentofanykindwhatever;orwhereanyadvice,direction,informationor knowledge may be obtained for the purpose of caus-ing the miscarriage or abortion of any woman pregnantwithchild,atanyperiodofherpregnancy,orshallknowingly sell or cause to be sold any medicine, or whoshallknowinglyuseorcausetobeusedanymeans
——————
95 Neb. Rev. Stat., Tit. 4, ch. 4, §42 (1866) (emphasis added); see alsoNeb. Gen. Stat., ch. 58, §§6, 39 (1873) (expanding criminal liability forabortionsbyothermeans,includinginstruments).
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whatsoever for that purpose, shall be punished by im-prisonment in the penitentiary for not less than threeyears,orbyafineofnotlessthanfivehundrednormore than one thousand dollars, or by both, in the dis-cretion of the Court; and in case of fine being imposed,one half thereof shall be paid to the State of Maryland,and one-half to the School Fund of the city or countywhere the offence was committed; provided, however,thatnothinghereincontainedshallbeconstruedsoasto prohibit the supervision and management by a reg-ular practitioner of medicine of all cases of abortion oc-curring spontaneously, either as the result of accident,constitutionaldebility,oranyothernatural cause, orthe production of abortion by a regular practitioner ofmedicine when, after consulting with one or more re-spectable physicians, he shall be satisfied that the foe-tusisdead,orthatnoothermethodwillsecurethesafetyofthemother.”96 27.Florida(1868):Ch. 3, Sec. 11. “Every person who shall administerto any woman pregnant with a quick child any medi-cine, drug, or substance whatever, or shall use or em-ployanyinstrument,orothermeans,withintentthereby to destroy such child, unless the same shallhave been necessary to preserve the life of such mother,or shall have been advised by two physicians to be nec-essaryforsuchpurpose,shall,incasethedeathofsuchchildorofsuchmotherbetherebyproduced,bedeemedguiltyofmanslaughterintheseconddegree.”
Ch. 8, Sec. 9.“Whoever, with intent to procure mis-carriage of any woman, unlawfully administers to her,or advises, or prescribes for her, or causes to be takenby her, any poison, drug, medicine, or other noxiousthing,orunlawfullyusesanyinstrumentorother
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961868Md.Lawsp.315(emphasisdeletedandadded).
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means whatever with the like intent, or with like intentaidsorassiststherein,shall,ifthewomandoesnotdieinconsequencethereof,bepunishedbyimprisonmentintheStatepenittentiarynotexceeding seven years,norlessthanoneyear,orbyfinenotexceedingonethousanddollars.”97 28.Minnesota(1873):Sec. 1.“That any person who shall administer to anywoman with child, or prescribe for any such woman, orsuggest to, or advise, or procure her to take any medi-cine,drug,substanceorthingwhatever,orwhoshalluse or employ, or advise or suggest the use or employ-ment of any instrument or other means or force what-ever, with intent thereby to cause or procure the mis-carriageorabortionorprematurelaborofanysuchwoman, unless the same shall have been necessary topreserve her life, or the life of such child, shall, in casethedeathofsuchchildorofsuchwomanresultsinwhole or in part therefrom, be deemed guilty of a fel-ony, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished byimprisonment in the state prison for a term not morethanten(10)yearsnorlessthanthree(3)years.”
Sec.2.“Anypersonwhoshalladministertoanywoman with child, or prescribe, or procure, or providefor any such woman, or suggest to, or advise, or procureany such woman to take any medicine, drug, substanceorthingwhatever, or shall use or employ, or suggest,or advise the use or employment of any instrument orother means or force whatever, with intent thereby tocause or procure the miscarriage or abortion or prema-turelaborofanysuchwoman,shalluponconvictionthereofbepunishedbyimprisonmentinthe stateprisonforatermnotmorethantwoyearsnorlessthan
——————
971868Fla.Laws,ch.1637,pp.64,97(emphasisadded).
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one year, or by fine not more than five thousand dollarsnor less than five hundred dollars, or by such fine andimprisonmentboth,atthediscretionofthecourt.”98 29.Arkansas(1875):Sec. 1.“That it shall be unlawful for any one to ad-minister or prescribe any medicine or drugs to anywoman with child, with intent to produce an abortion,or premature delivery of any foetus before the period ofquickening, or to produce or attempt to produce suchabortion by any other means; and any person offendingagainst the provision of this section, shall be fined inany sum not exceeding one thousand ($1000) dollars,andimprisonedinthepenitentiarynotlessthanone nor more than five (5) years; provided, that this sec-tion shall not apply to any abortion produced by anyregular practicing physician, for the purpose of savingthemother’slife.”99 30.Georgia(1876):Sec. 2.“That every person who shall administer toany woman pregnant with a child, any medicine, drug,or substance whatever, or shall use or employ any in-strument or other means, with intent thereby to de-stroy such child, unless the same shall have been nec-essary to preserve the life of such mother, or shall havebeen advised by two physicians to be necessary for suchpurpose, shall, in case the death of such child or motherbe thereby produced, be declared guilty of an assaultwithintenttomurder.”
Sec. 3.“That any person who shall wilfully adminis-ter to any pregnant woman any medicine, drug or sub-stance, or anything whatever, or shall employ any in-strumentormeanswhatever,withintenttherebyto
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981873Minn.Lawspp.117–118(emphasisadded).
991875Ark.Actsp.5(emphasisaddedanddeleted).
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procurethemiscarriageorabortionof any suchwoman, unless the same shall have been necessary topreserve the life of such woman, or shall have been ad-vised by two physicians to be necessary for that pur-pose, shall, upon conviction, be punished as prescribedinsection4310oftheRevisedCodeofGeorgia.”100 31.North Carolina (1881):Sec. 1. “That every person who shall wilfully admin-istertoanywomaneitherpregnantorquickwithchild,or prescribe for any such woman, or advise or procureany such woman to take any medicine, drug or sub-stance whatever, or shall use or employ any instrumentor other means with intent thereby to destroy saidchild, unless the same shall have been necessary to pre-servethelifeofsuchmother,shallbeguiltyofafelony,and shall be imprisoned in the state penitentiary fornotlessthanoneyearnormorethantenyears,andbefinedatthediscretionofthecourt.”
Sec.2.“Thateverypersonwhoshall administer toany pregnant woman, or prescribe for any such woman,or advise and procure such woman to take any medi-cine, drug or any thing whatsoever, with intent therebyto procure the miscarriage of any such woman, or toinjure or destroy such woman, or shall use any instru-ment or application for any of the above purposes, shallbe guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall beimprisoned in the jail or state penitentiary for not lessthan one year or more than five years, and fined at thediscretionofthecourt.”101 32.Delaware(1883):Sec.2.“Everypersonwho,withtheintenttoprocure
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1001876Ga.Acts&Resolutionsp.113(emphasisadded).
1011881N.C.Sess.Lawspp.584–585(emphasisadded).
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the miscarriage of any pregnant woman or women sup-posedbysuchpersontobepregnant,unlessthesamebenecessarytopreserveherlife,shalladminister toher, advise, or prescribe for her, or cause to be taken byher any poison, drug, medicine, or other noxious thing,orshalluseanyinstrumentorothermeanswhatso-ever, or shall aid, assist, or counsel any person so in-tending to procure a miscarriage, whether said miscar-riage be accomplished or not, shall be guilty of a felony,and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not less thanone hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dol-lars and be imprisoned for a term not exceeding fiveyearsnorlessthanoneyear.”102 33.Tennessee(1883):Sec. 1.“That every person who shall administer toany woman pregnant with child, whether such child bequick or not, any medicine, drug or substance what-ever, or shall use or employ any instrument, or othermeanswhateverwithintenttodestroysuchchild,andshalltherebydestroysuchchildbeforeitsbirth,unlessthesameshallhavebeendonewithaviewtopreservethe life of the mother, shall be punished by imprison-ment in the penitentiary not less than one nor morethanfiveyears.”
Sec. 2. “Every person who shall administer any sub-stancewiththeintentiontoprocurethemiscarriageofa woman then being with child, or shall use or employany instrument or other means with such intent, un-lessthesameshallhavebeendonewithaviewtopre-serve the life of such mother, shall be punished by im-prisonment in the penitentiary not less than one normorethanthreeyears.”103
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1021883Del.Laws,ch.226(emphasisadded).
1031883Tenn.Actspp.188–189(emphasisadded).
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Sec. 2.“That any person who shall administer to anywomanwithchild,orprescribeorprocureorprovideforanysuchwoman,oradviseorprocureanysuchwoman to take, any medicine, drug, substance or thingwhatever, or shall use or employ or advise the use oremployment of, any instrument or other means of forcewhatever, with intent thereby to cause or procure themiscarriage or abortion or premature labor of any suchwoman, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished byimprisonment in the Penitentiary for a term not morethan five years, or by fine not more than five thousanddollars, or by such fine and imprisonment both, at thediscretion of the Court; but no conviction shall be hadunder the provisions of Section 1 or 2 of this Act upontheuncorroboratedevidenceofsuchwoman.”104 35.Kentucky(1910):Sec. 1.“It shall be unlawful for any person to pre-scribeoradministertoanypregnantwoman,ortoany
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1041883S.C.Actspp.547–548(emphasisadded).
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woman whom he has reason to believe pregnant, at anytimeduringtheperiodofgestation,anydrug,medicineorsubstance,whatsoever,withtheintenttherebytoprocure the miscarriage of such woman, or with like in-tent, to use any instrument or means whatsoever, un-less such miscarriage is necessary to preserve her life;and any person so offending, shall be punished by a fineof not less than five hundred nor more than one thou-sand dollars, and imprisoned in the State prison for notlessthanonenormorethantenyears.”
Sec. 2.“If by reason of any of the acts described inSection 1 hereof, the miscarriage of such woman is pro-cured,andshedoesmiscarry,causingthedeathoftheunbornchild,whetherbeforeorafterquickeningtime,the person so offending shall be guilty of a felony, andconfined in the penitentiary for not less than two, normorethantwenty-oneyears.”
Sec. 3. “If, by reason of the commission of any of theacts described in Section 1 hereof, the woman to whomsuch drug or substance has been administered, or uponwhom such instrument has been used, shall die, theperson offending shall be punished as now prescribedby law, for the offense of murder or manslaughter, asthefactsmayjustify.”
Sec.4.“Theconsentofthewomantotheperfor-mance of the operation or administering of the medi-cinesorsubstances,referredto,shallbe no defense,and she shall be a competent witness in any prosecu-tionunderthisact,andforthatpurposesheshallnotbeconsideredanaccomplice.”105 36.Mississippi(1952):Sec.1.“Whoever,bymeansofanyinstrument,med-icine,drug,orothermeanswhatevershallwillfullyand
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1051910Ky.Actspp.189–190(emphasisadded).
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knowinglycauseanywomanpregnantwithchild toabort or miscarry, or attempts to procure or produce anabortion or miscarriage, unless the same were done asnecessary for the preservation of the mother’s life, shallbeimprisonedinthestatepenitentiary no less thanone (1) year, nor more than ten (10) years; or if thedeath of the mother results therefrom, the person pro-curing, causing, or attempting to procure or cause theabortionormiscarriageshallbeguiltyofmurder.”
Sec. 2.“No act prohibited in section 1 hereof shall beconsideredasnecessaryforthepreservationofthemother’slifeunlessupontheprioradvice,inwriting,oftworeputablelicensedphysicians.”
Sec. 3.“The license of any physician or nurse shallbe automatically revoked upon conviction under theprovisionsofthisact.”106
B
This appendix contains statutes criminalizing abortion atall stages in each of the Territories that became States andin the District of Columbia.The statutes appear in chron-ologicalorderofenactment. 1.Hawaii(1850):Sec. 1.“Whoever maliciously, without lawful justifi-cation, administers, or causes or procures to be admin-istered any poison or noxious thing to a woman thenwith child, in order to produce her mis-carriage, or ma-liciously uses any instrument or other means with likeintent,shall,ifsuchwomanbethenquickwithchild,be punished by fine not exceeding one thousand dollarsandimprisonmentathardlabornotmorethanfiveyears.And if she be then not quick with child, shall bepunishedbyafinenotexceedingfivehundreddollars,
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1061952Miss.Lawsp.289(codifiedatMiss.CodeAnn.§2223(1956)(emphasisadded)).
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andimprisonmentathardlabornotmorethantwoyears.”
Sec.2.“Wheremeansofcausingabortionareusedfor the purpose of saving the life of the woman, the sur-geon or other person using such means is lawfully jus-tified.”107 2.Washington(1854):Sec. 37.“Every person who shall administer to anywomanpregnantwithaquickchild,anymedicine,drug, or substance whatever, or shall use or employ anyinstrument,orothermeans,withintenttherebytode-stroy such child, unless the same shall have been nec-essarytopreservethelifeofsuchmother,shall,incasethe death of such child or of such mother be therebyproduced, on conviction thereof, be imprisoned in thepenitentiarynotmorethantwentyyears,norlessthanoneyear.”
Sec. 38.“Every person who shall administer to anypregnantwoman,ortoanywomanwhohesupposestobepregnant,anymedicine,drug,orsubstancewhat-ever, or shall use or employ any instrument, or othermeans,therebytoprocurethemiscarriageofsuchwoman, unless the same is necessary to preserve herlife, shall on conviction thereof, be imprisoned in thepenitentiary not more than five years, nor less than oneyear, or be imprisoned in the county jail not more thantwelvemonths,norlessthanonemonth,andbefinedinanysumnotexceedingonethousanddollars.”108 3.Colorado(1861):——————
107 Haw. Penal Code, ch. 12, §§1–2 (1850) (emphasis added).Hawaiibecame a State in 1959.See Presidential Proclamation No. 3309, 73Stat.c74–c75.
108 Terr. of Wash. Stat., ch. 2, §§37–38, p. 81 (1854) (emphasis added).Washington became a State in 1889. See Presidential ProclamationNo.8,26Stat.1552–1553.
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Sec. 42.“[E]very person who shall administer sub-stanceorliquid,orwhoshalluseorcausetobeusedany instrument, of whatsoever kind, with the intentiontoprocurethemiscarriageofanywoman then beingwith child, and shall thereof be duly convicted, shall beimprisoned for a term not exceeding three years, andfinedinasumnotexceedingonethousanddollars;andifanywoman,byreasonofsuchtreatment,shalldie,the person or persons administering, or causing to beadministered,suchpoison,substanceorliquid,orus-ing or causing to be used, any instrument, as aforesaid,shallbedeemedguiltyofmanslaughter,andifcon-victed,bepunishedaccordingly.”109 4.Idaho(1864):Sec.42.“[E]verypersonwhoshalladministerorcausetobeadministered,ortaken,anymedicinalsub-stance, or shall use or cause to be used, any instru-mentswhatever,withtheintentiontoprocurethemis-carriage of any woman then being with child, and shallbe thereof duly convicted, shall be punished by impris-onment in the territorial prison for a term not less thantwoyears,normorethanfiveyears:Provided,Thatnophysician shall be effected by the last clause of this sec-tion, who in the discharge of his professional duties,deems it necessary to produce the miscarriage of anywomaninordertosaveherlife.”110 5.Montana(1864):Sec.41.“[E]verypersonwhoshalladminister,orcause to be administered, or taken, any medicinal sub-stance,orshalluse,orcausetobeused,anyinstru-
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1091861Terr.ofColo.Gen.Lawspp.296–297. Colorado became aStatein1876.SeePresidential Proclamation No. 7, 19Stat. 665–666.
110 1863–1864Terr.ofIdahoLawsp.443.IdahobecameaState in1890.See26Stat.215–219.
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ments whatever, with the intention to produce the mis-carriageofanywomanthenbeingwithchild,andshallbe thereof duly convicted, shall be punished by impris-onmentintheTerritorialprisonfora term not lessthantwoyearsnormorethan five years. Provided,That no physician shall be affected by the last clause ofthissection,whointhedischargeofhisprofessionalduties deems it necessary to produce the miscarriage ofanywomaninordertosaveherlife.”111 6.Arizona(1865):Sec.45.“[E]verypersonwhoshalladminister orcause to be administered or taken, any medicinal sub-stances,orshalluseorcausetobeusedanyinstru-ments whatever, with the intention to procure the mis-carriageofanywomanthenbeingwithchild,andshallbe thereof duly convicted, shall be punished by impris-onmentintheTerritorialprisonfora term not lessthan two years nor more than five years: Provided, thatno physician shall be affected by the last clause of thissection, who in the discharge of his professional duties,deems it necessary to produce the miscarriage of anywomaninordertosaveherlife.”112 7.Wyoming(1869):Sec.25.“[A]nypersonwhoshalladminister,orcause to be administered, or taken, any such poison,substance or liquid, or who shall use, or cause to beused, any instrument of whatsoever kind, with the in-tention to procure the miscarriage of any woman thenbeing with child, and shall thereof be duly convicted,shallbeimprisonedforatermnotexceedingthree
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1111864Terr.ofMont.Lawsp.184.MontanabecameaStatein1889.SeePresidentialProclamationNo.7,26Stat.1551–1552.
112HowellCode,ch.10,§45(1865). ArizonabecameaStatein1912.
SeePresidentialProclamationofFeb.14,1912,37Stat.1728–1729.
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years, in the penitentiary, and fined in a sum not ex-ceeding one thousand dollars; and if any woman by rea-sonofsuchtreatmentshalldie,theperson,orpersons,administering,orcausingtobeadministeredsuchpoi-son, substance, or liquid, or using or causing to be used,anyinstrument,asaforesaid,shallbedeemedguiltyofmanslaughter, and if convicted, be punished by impris-onmentforatermnotlessthanthreeyearsinthepen-itentiary, and fined in a sum not exceeding one thou-sand dollars, unless it appear that such miscarriagewas procured or attempted by, or under advice of a phy-sician or surgeon, with intent to save the life of suchwoman, or to prevent serious and permanent bodily in-jurytoher.”113 8.Utah(1876):Sec.142.“Everypersonwhoprovides,supplies,oradministersto any pregnantwoman, or procures anysuch woman to take any medicine, drug, or substance,orusesoremploysanyinstrumentorothermeanswhatever,withintenttherebytoprocurethemiscar-riage of such woman, unless the same is necessary topreserve her life, is punishable by imprisonment in thepenitentiarynotlessthantwonormorethantenyears.”114 9.NorthDakota(1877):Sec.337.“Everypersonwhoadministerstoanypregnantwoman,orwhoprescribesforanysuchwoman, or advises or procures any such woman to takeanymedicine,drugorsubstance,orusesoremploys
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113 1869 Terr. of Wyo. Gen. Laws p. 104 (emphasis added).WyomingbecameaStatein1889.See26Stat.222–226.
114 Terr. of Utah Comp. Laws §1972 (1876) (emphasis added).Utahbecame a State in 1896.See Presidential Proclamation No. 9, 29 Stat.876–877.
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any instrument, or other means whatever with intentthereby to procure the miscarriage of such woman, un-less the same is necessary to preserve her life, is pun-ishablebyimprisonmentintheterritorialprisonnotexceeding three years, or in a county jail not exceedingoneyear.”115 SouthDakota(1877):SameasNorthDakota. 11.Oklahoma(1890):Sec.2187.“Everypersonwhoadministerstoanypregnantwoman,orwhoprescribesforanysuchwoman, or advises or procures any such woman to takeanymedicine,drugorsubstance,orusesoremploysany instrument, or other means whatever, with intentthereby to procure the miscarriage of such woman, un-less the same is necessary to preserve her life, is pun-ishable by imprisonment in the Territorial prison notexceeding three years, or in a county jail not exceedingoneyear.”116 12.Alaska(1899):Sec. 8.“That if any person shall administer to anywoman pregnant with a child any medicine, drug, orsubstance whatever, or shall use any instrument orothermeans,withintenttherebytodestroysuchchild,unlessthesameshallbenecessarytopreservethelifeof such mother, such person shall, in case the death ofsuchchildormotherbetherebyproduced,bedeemed
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115 Dakota Penal Code §337 (1877) (codified at N. D. Rev. Code §7177(1895)), and S. D. Rev. Penal Code Ann. §337 (1883).North and SouthDakota became States in 1889. See Presidential Proclamation No. 5, 26Stat.1548–1551.
116 Okla.Stat.§2187(1890)(emphasisadded).Oklahomabecame aStatein1907.SeePresidentialProclamationofNov.16,1907,35Stat.
2160–2161.
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guilty of manslaughter, and shall be punished accord-ingly.”117 13.NewMexico(1919):Sec.1.“Anypersonwhoshalladministertoanypregnantwomananymedicine,drugorsubstancewhatever, or attempt by operation or any other methodor means to produce an abortion or miscarriage uponsuch woman, shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon con-viction thereof, shall be fined not more than two thou-sand($2,000.00)Dollars,norlessthanfivehundred($500.00) Dollars, or imprisoned in the penitentiary foraperiodofnotlessthanonenormorethanfiveyears,or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretionofthecourttryingthecase.”
Sec. 2.“Any person committing such act or acts men-tionedinsectiononehereofwhichshallculminateinthe death of the woman shall be deemed guilty of mur-der in the second degree; Provided, however, an abor-tion may be produced when two physicians licensed topracticeintheStateofNewMexico,inconsultation,deem it necessary to preserve the life of the woman, ortopreventseriousandpermanentbodilyinjury.”
Sec. 3.“For the purpose of the act, the term “preg-nancy” is defined as that condition of a woman from thedateofconceptiontothebirthofherchild.”118
* * * DistrictofColumbia(1901):Sec. 809.“Whoever, with intent to procure the mis-carriageofanywoman,prescribesoradministerstoher
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117 1899 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 2, p. 3 (emphasis added). Alaska be-came a State in 1959.See Presidential Proclamation No. 3269, 73 Stat.c16.
118 N. M. Laws p. 6 (emphasis added).New Mexico became a State in1912.SeePresidentialProclamationofJan.6,1912,37Stat.1723–1724.
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any medicine, drug, or substance whatever, or with likeintent uses any instrument or means, unless when nec-essary to preserve her life or health and under the di-rectionofacompetentlicensedpractitionerofmedi-cine,shallbeimprisonedfornotmorethanfiveyears;or if the woman or her child dies in consequence of suchact, by imprisonment for not less than three nor morethantwentyyears.”119
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119§809,31Stat.1322(1901)(emphasisadded).
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THOMAS,J.,concurring SUPREMECOURTOFTHEUNITEDSTATESNo.19–1392
THOMASE.DOBBS,STATEHEALTHOFFICEROFTHEMISSISSIPPIDEPARTMENTOFHEALTH,ETAL.,PETITIONERSv.JACKSONWOMEN’S
HEALTHORGANIZATION,ETAL.
ONWRITOFCERTIORARITOTHEUNITEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALSFORTHEFIFTHCIRCUIT
[June24,2022]
JUSTICETHOMAS,concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court because it correctly holdsthat there is no constitutional right to abortion.Respond-ents invoke one source for that right: the FourteenthAmendment’s guarantee that no State shall “deprive anyperson of life, liberty, or property without due process oflaw.”The Court well explains why, under our substantivedue process precedents, the purported right to abortion isnotaformof“liberty”protectedbytheDueProcessClause.Such a right is neither “deeply rooted in this Nation’s his-tory and tradition” nor “implicit in the concept of orderedliberty.”Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721(1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).“[T]he idea thatthe Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood theDue Process Clause to protect a right to abortion is farcical.”June Medical Services L. L. C. v. Russo, 591 U. S. ,(2020)(THOMAS,J.,dissenting)(slipop.,at17).
Iwriteseparatelytoemphasizeasecond,morefunda-
mentalreasonwhythereisnoabortionguaranteelurkingintheDueProcessClause.Considerable historical evi-dence indicates that “due process of law” merely requiredexecutive and judicial actors to comply with legislative en-actmentsandthecommonlawwhendeprivingapersonof
2 DOBBSv. JACKSON WOMEN’SHEALTH ORGANIZATION
THOMAS,J.,concurring
life, liberty, or property.See, e.g., Johnson v. United States,576 U. S. 591, 623 (2015) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judg-ment).Other sources, by contrast, suggest that “due pro-cess of law” prohibited legislatures “from authorizing thedeprivation of a person’s life, liberty, or property withoutproviding him the customary procedures to which freemenwere entitled by the old law of England.”United States v.Vaello Madero, 596 U. S.,(2022) (THOMAS, J., con-curring)(slipop.,at3)(internalquotationmarksomitted).Either way, the Due Process Clause at most guaranteesprocess. It does not, as the Court’s substantive due processcases suppose, “forbi[d] the government to infringe certain‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what pro-cessisprovided.”Renov.Flores,507U.S.292,302(1993);see also, e.g., Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 125(1992).
AsIhavepreviouslyexplained,“substantivedueprocess”
isanoxymoronthat“lack[s]anybasisintheConstitution.”Johnson, 576 U. S., at 607–608 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); seealso, e.g., Vaello Madero, 596 U. S., at(THOMAS, J., con-curring) (slip op., at 3) (“[T]ext and history provide littlesupport for modern substantive due process doctrine”).“Thenotionthataconstitutionalprovisionthatguaranteesonly‘process’beforeapersonisdeprivedoflife,liberty,orpropertycoulddefinethesubstanceofthoserightsstrainscredulity for even the most casual user of words.”McDon-aldv.Chicago,561U.S.742,811(2010)(THOMAS,J.,con-
curringinpartandconcurringinjudgment);seealsoUnited States v. Carlton, 512 U. S. 26, 40 (1994) (Scalia, J.,concurring in judgment).The resolution of this case is thusstraightforward. Because the Due Process Clause does notsecure any substantive rights, it does not secure a right toabortion.
The Court today declines to disturb substantive due pro-cess jurisprudence generally or the doctrine’s application inother,specificcontexts.CaseslikeGriswoldv.Connecticut,
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381 U. S. 479 (1965) (right of married persons to obtain con-traceptives)*; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003) (rightto engage in private, consensual sexual acts); and Oberge-fellv.Hodges,576U.S.644(2015)(righttosame-sexmar-riage), are not at issue.The Court’s abortion cases areunique, see ante, at 31–32, 66, 71–72, and no party hasaskedustodecide“whetherourentireFourteenthAmend-ment jurisprudence must be preserved or revised,” McDon-ald, 561 U. S., at 813 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).Thus, I agreethat “[n]othing in [the Court’s] opinion should be under-stood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abor-tion.”Ante,at66.
Forthatreason,infuturecases,weshouldreconsiderallofthisCourt’ssubstantivedueprocessprecedents,includ-ing Griswold, Lawrence, and Obergefell.Because any sub-stantive due process decision is “demonstrably erroneous,”Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S.,(2020) (THOMAS, J.,concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 7), we have a duty to“correcttheerror”establishedinthoseprecedents,Gamble
v. United States, 587 U. S.,(2019) (THOMAS, J., con-curring) (slip op., at 9). After overruling these demonstra-blyerroneousdecisions,thequestionwouldremainwhether other constitutional provisions guarantee the myr-iadrightsthatoursubstantivedueprocesscaseshavegen-erated.Forexample,wecouldconsiderwhetheranyoftherights announced in this Court’s substantive due processcases are “privileges or immunities of citizens of the UnitedStates”protectedbytheFourteenthAmendment. Amdt.
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*Griswold v. Connecticut purported not to rely on the Due ProcessClause,butratherreasoned“thatspecificguaranteesintheBillofRights”—including rights enumerated in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth,and Ninth Amendments—“have penumbras, formed by emanations,”that create “zones of privacy.”381 U. S., at 484.Since Griswold, theCourt,perhapsrecognizingthefacialabsurdityofGriswold’spenumbralargument, has characterized the decision as one rooted in substantivedueprocess.See,e.g.,Obergefellv.Hodges,576U.S.644,663(2015);
Washingtonv.Glucksberg,521U.S.702,720(1997).
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14,§1;seeMcDonald,561U.S.,at806(opinionofTHOMAS,J.).To answer that question, we would need to decide im-portantantecedentquestions,includingwhetherthePrivi-legesorImmunitiesClauseprotectsanyrightsthatarenotenumerated in the Constitution and, if so, how to identifythose rights.See id., at 854.That said, even if the Clausedoes protect unenumerated rights, the Court conclusivelydemonstrates that abortion is not one of them under anyplausibleinterpretiveapproach.Seeante,at15,n.22.
Moreover, apart from being a demonstrably incorrectreadingoftheDueProcessClause,the“legalfiction”ofsub-stantive due process is “particularly dangerous.”McDon-ald, 561 U. S., at 811 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); accord, Ober-gefell, 576 U. S., at 722 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).At leastthreedangers favor jettisoningthedoctrine entirely.
First, “substantive due process exalts judges at the ex-pense of the People from whom they derive their authority.”Ibid.BecausetheDueProcessClause“speaksonlyto‘pro-cess,’ the Court has long struggled to define what substan-tive rights it protects.” Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U. S.,(2019)(THOMAS,J.,concurringinjudgment)(slipop.,at2)(internal quotation marks omitted).In practice, the Court’sapproach for identifying those “fundamental” rights “un-questionablyinvolvespolicymakingratherthanneutralle-galanalysis.”Carlton,512U. S.,at41–42(opinion ofScalia, J.); see also McDonald, 561 U. S., at 812 (opinion ofTHOMAS, J.) (substantive due process is “a jurisprudencedevoid of a guiding principle”).The Court divines newrights in line with “its own, extraconstitutional value pref-erences” and nullifies state laws that do not align with thejudiciallycreatedguarantees.Thornburghv.AmericanCollege of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747,794(1986)(White,J.,dissenting).
Nowhere is this exaltation of judicial policymaking
clearerthanthisCourt’sabortionjurisprudence. InRoev.
Wade,410U. S.113(1973),theCourtdivinedarightto
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abortion because it “fe[lt]” that “the Fourteenth Amend-ment’sconceptofpersonalliberty”includeda“rightofpri-vacy”that“isbroadenoughtoencompassawoman’sdeci-sionwhetherornottoterminateherpregnancy.”Id.,at
153.In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,505U.S.833(1992),theCourtlikewiseidentifiedanabor-tion guarantee in “the liberty protected by the FourteenthAmendment,” but, rather than a “right of privacy,” it in-vokedanethereal“righttodefineone’sownconceptofex-istence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery ofhuman life.”Id., at 851.As the Court’s preferred manifes-tationof“liberty”changed,so,too,didthetestusedtopro-tect it, as Roe’s author lamented.See Casey, 505 U. S., at930 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting inpart) (“[T]he Roe framework is far more administrable, andfarlessmanipulable,thanthe‘undueburden’standard”).
Now,inthiscase,thenatureofthepurported“liberty”
supportingtheabortionrighthasshiftedyetagain.Re-spondentsandtheUnitedStatesproposenofewerthanthreedifferentintereststhatsupposedlyspringfromtheDueProcessClause.Theyinclude“bodilyintegrity,”“per-sonalautonomyinmattersoffamily,medicalcare,andfaith,”BriefforRespondents21,and“women’sequalciti-zenship,”BriefforUnitedStatesasAmicusCuriae24.That50yearshavepassedsinceRoeandabortionadvocatesstillcannotcoherentlyarticulatetheright(orrights)atstakeprovestheobvious:Therighttoabortionisultimatelyapol-icygoalindesperatesearchofaconstitutionaljustification.Second,substantivedueprocessdistortsotherareasofconstitutional law.For example, once this Court identifiesa“fundamental”rightforoneclassofindividuals,itinvokestheEqualProtectionClausetodemandexactingscrutinyofstatutesthatdenytherighttoothers.See,e.g.,Eisenstadtv.Baird,405U. S.438,453–454(1972)(relyingonGris-woldtoinvalidateastatestatuteprohibitingdistribution
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of contraceptives to unmarried persons).Statutory classifi-cations implicating certain “nonfundamental” rights, mean-while, receive only cursory review.See, e.g., Armour v. In-dianapolis, 566 U. S. 673, 680 (2012).Similarly, this Courtdeems unconstitutionally “vague” or “overbroad” those lawsthat impinge on its preferred rights, while letting slidethose laws that implicate supposedly lesser values.See,e.g., Johnson, 576 U. S., at 618–621 (opinion of THOMAS, J.);United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U. S. , –(2020) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op., at 3–5).“In fact,our vagueness doctrine served as the basis for the first draftof the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade,” and it since hasbeen “deployed . . . to nullify even mild regulations of theabortionindustry.”Johnson,576U. S.,at620–621(opinionof THOMAS, J.).Therefore, regardless of the doctrinal con-text,theCourtoften“demand[s]extrajustificationsforen-croachments” on “preferred rights” while “relax[ing] pur-portedly higher standards of review for less-preferred rights.”Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,579U.S.582,640–642(2016)(THOMAS,J.,dissenting).
Substantivedueprocessisthecoreinspirationformanyof
theCourt’sconstitutionallyunmooredpolicyjudgments.
Third, substantive due process is often wielded to “disas-trous ends.”Gamble, 587 U. S., at(THOMAS, J., concur-ring) (slip op., at 16).For instance, in Dred Scott v. Sand-ford, 19 How. 393 (1857), the Court invoked a species ofsubstantive due process to announce that Congress waspowerless to emancipate slaves brought into the federal ter-ritories.See id., at 452. While Dred Scott “was overruledon the battlefields of the Civil War and by constitutionalamendmentafterAppomattox,”Obergefell,576U. S.,at696(ROBERTS,C. J.,dissenting),thatoverrulingwas“[p]urchased at the price of immeasurable human suffer-ing,” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 240(1995) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring injudgment).Nowtoday,theCourtrightlyoverrulesRoeand
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Casey—two of this Court’s “most notoriously incorrect” sub-stantivedueprocess decisions, Timbs, 586 U. S., at(opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 2)—after more than 63millionabortionshavebeenperformed,seeNationalRightto Life Committee, Abortion Statistics (Jan.2022), https://www.nrlc.org/uploads/factsheets/FS01AbortionintheUS.pdf.Theharmcausedbythis Court’s forays into substantivedueprocessremainsimmeasurable.
* * *
Because the Court properly applies our substantive dueprocess precedents toreject the fabrication of a constitu-tional right to abortion, and because this case does not pre-sent the opportunity to reject substantive due process en-tirely, I join the Court’s opinion.But, in future cases, weshould “follow the text of the Constitution, which sets forthcertain substantive rights that cannot be taken away, andadds,beyondthat,arighttodueprocesswhenlife,liberty,or property is to be taken away.”Carlton, 512 U. S., at 42(opinionofScalia,J.). Substantive due process conflictswith that textual command and has harmed our country inmany ways.Accordingly, we should eliminate it from ourjurisprudenceattheearliestopportunity.
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KAVANAUGH,J.,concurring SUPREMECOURTOFTHEUNITEDSTATESNo.19–1392
THOMASE.DOBBS,STATEHEALTHOFFICEROFTHEMISSISSIPPIDEPARTMENTOFHEALTH,ETAL.,PETITIONERSv.JACKSONWOMEN’S
HEALTHORGANIZATION,ETAL.
ONWRITOFCERTIORARITOTHEUNITEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALSFORTHEFIFTHCIRCUIT
[June24,2022]
JUSTICEKAVANAUGH,concurring.
I write separately to explain my additional views aboutwhy Roe was wrongly decided, why Roe should be overruledatthistime,andthefutureimplicationsoftoday’sdecision.
I
Abortion is a profoundly difficult and contentious issuebecause it presents an irreconcilable conflict between theinterests of a pregnant woman who seeks an abortion andthe interests in protecting fetal life.The interests on bothsidesoftheabortionissueareextraordinarilyweighty.
Ontheoneside,manypro-choiceadvocatesforcefullyar-guethattheabilitytoobtainanabortioniscriticallyim-portantforwomen’spersonalandprofessionallives,andforwomen’shealth.Theycontendthatthewidespreadavaila-bilityofabortionhasbeenessentialforwomentoadvanceinsocietyandtoachievegreaterequalityoverthelast50years.Andtheymaintainthatwomenmusthavethefree-domtochooseforthemselveswhethertohaveanabortion.Ontheotherside,manypro-life advocates forcefully ar-guethatafetusisahumanlife.Theycontendthatallhu-manlifeshouldbeprotectedasamatterofhumandignity
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and fundamental morality.And they stress that a signifi-cantpercentageofAmericanswithpro-lifeviewsarewomen.
When it comes to abortion, one interest must prevail overthe other at any given point in a pregnancy.Many Ameri-cans of good faith would prioritize the interests of the preg-nant woman.Many other Americans of good faith insteadwould prioritize the interests in protecting fetal life—atleast unless, for example, an abortion is necessary to savethe life of the mother. Of course, many Americans are con-flictedorhavenuancedviewsthatmayvarydependingonthe particular time in pregnancy, or the particular circum-stancesofapregnancy.
The issue before this Court, however, is not the policy ormorality of abortion. The issue before this Court is whattheConstitutionsays about abortion. The Constitutiondoes not take sides on the issue of abortion.The text of theConstitution does not refer to or encompass abortion.To besure, this Court has held that the Constitution protects un-enumerated rightsthat are deeply rooted in this Nation’shistory and tradition, and implicit in the concept of orderedliberty.But a right to abortion is not deeply rooted in Amer-icanhistoryandtradition,astheCourttodaythoroughlyexplains.1
Onthequestionofabortion,theConstitutionisthereforeneitherpro-lifenorpro-choice.TheConstitutionisneutralandleavestheissueforthepeopleandtheirelectedrepre-sentativestoresolvethroughthedemocraticprocessinthe
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1 TheCourt’sopiniontodayalsorecountsthepre-constitutionalcommon-lawhistoryinEngland.ThatEnglishhistorysuppliesback-ground information on the issue of abortion.As I see it, the dispositivepointinanalyzingAmericanhistoryandtraditionforpurposesoftheFourteenthAmendmentinquiryisthatabortionwaslargelyprohibitedinmostAmericanStatesasof1868whentheFourteenthAmendmentwasratified,andthatabortionremainedlargelyprohibitedinmostAmericanStatesuntilRoewasdecidedin1973.
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States or Congress—like the numerous other difficult ques-tions of American social and economic policy that the Con-stitutiondoesnotaddress.
Because the Constitution is neutral on the issue of abor-tion,thisCourtalso must be scrupulously neutral. Thenine unelected Members of this Court do not possess theconstitutional authority to override the democratic processandtodecreeeitherapro-lifeorapro-choiceabortionpolicyforall330millionpeopleintheUnitedStates.
InsteadofadheringtotheConstitution’sneutrality,theCourtinRoetooksidesontheissueandunilaterallyde-creed that abortion was legal throughout the United Statesup to the point of viability (about 24 weeks of pregnancy).The Court’s decision today properly returns the Court to aposition of neutrality and restores the people’s authority toaddress the issue of abortion through the processes of dem-ocraticself-governmentestablishedbytheConstitution.
Some amicus briefs argue that the Court today should notonly overrule Roe and return to a position of judicial neu-tralityonabortion,butshouldgofurtherandholdthattheConstitutionoutlawsabortionthroughouttheUnitedStates.No Justice of this Court has ever advanced that po-sition.I respect those who advocate for that position, justas I respect those who argue that this Court should holdthattheConstitutionlegalizespre-viabilityabortionthroughouttheUnitedStates.Butbothpositionsarewrong as a constitutional matter, in my view.The Consti-tutionneitheroutlawsabortionnorlegalizesabortion.
To be clear, then, the Court’s decision today does not out-lawabortionthroughouttheUnitedStates.On the con-trary, the Court’s decision properly leaves the question ofabortion for the people and their elected representatives inthe democratic process.Through that democratic process,the people and their representatives may decide to allow orlimit abortion. As Justice Scalia stated, the “States may, iftheywish,permitabortionondemand,buttheConstitution
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doesnotrequirethemtodoso.”PlannedParenthoodofSoutheasternPa.v.Casey,505U.S.833,979(1992)(opin-ionconcurringinjudgmentinpartanddissentinginpart).Today’s decision therefore does not prevent the numerousStatesthatreadilyallowabortionfromcontinuingtoread-ilyallowabortion.Thatincludes,iftheychoose,theamiciStatessupportingtheplaintiffinthisCourt:NewYork,California,Illinois,Maine,Massachusetts,RhodeIsland,Vermont,Connecticut,NewJersey,Pennsylvania,Dela-ware,Maryland,Michigan,Wisconsin,Minnesota,NewMexico,Colorado,Nevada,Oregon,Washington,andHa-waii.Bycontrast,otherStatesmaymaintainlawsthatmorestrictlylimitabortion.Aftertoday’sdecision,alloftheStatesmayevaluatethecompetinginterestsanddecide
howtoaddressthisconsequentialissue.2
Inarguingforaconstitutionalrighttoabortionthatwould override the people’s choices in the democratic pro-cess, the plaintiff Jackson Women’s Health Organizationand its amici emphasize that the Constitution does notfreeze the American people’s rights as of 1791 or 1868.Ifully agree.To begin, I agree that constitutional rights ap-ply to situations that were unforeseen in 1791 or 1868—such as applying the First Amendment to the Internet orthe Fourth Amendment to cars.Moreover, the Constitutionauthorizes the creation of new rights—state and federal,statutory and constitutional.But when it comes to creatingnew rights, the Constitution directs the people to the vari-ous processes of democratic self-government contemplatedby the Constitution—state legislation, state constitutionalamendments,federallegislation,andfederalconstitutional
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2 In his dissent inRoe, Justice Rehnquist indicated that anexceptionto a State’s restriction on abortion would be constitutionally requiredwhen an abortion is necessary to save the life of the mother.See Roe v.Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 173 (1973).Abortion statutes traditionally and cur-rentlyprovideforanexceptionwhenanabortionisnecessarytoprotectthelifeofthemother.Somestatutesalsoprovideotherexceptions.
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amendments.See generally Amdt. 9; Amdt. 10; Art. I, §8;Art. V; J. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and theMaking of American Constitutional Law 7−21, 203−216(2018);A.Amar,America’sConstitution:ABiography285−291,315−347(2005).
The Constitution does not grant the nine unelected Mem-bers of this Court the unilateral authority to rewrite theConstitution to create new rights and liberties based on ourown moral or policy views.As Justice Rehnquist stated,this Court has not “been granted a roving commission, ei-therbytheFoundingFathersorbytheframersoftheFour-teenth Amendment, to strike down laws that are basedupon notions of policy or morality suddenly found unac-ceptable by a majority of this Court.”Furman v. Georgia,408U.S.238, 467(1972)(dissentingopinion);see Washing-
tonv.Glucksberg,521U.S.702,720–721(1997);Cruzanv.
Director,Mo.Dept.ofHealth,497U.S.261,292–293(1990)(Scalia,J., concurring).
This Court therefore does not possess the authority eitherto declare a constitutional right to abortion or to declare aconstitutional prohibition of abortion. See Casey, 505 U. S.,at953(Rehnquist,C.J.,concurringinjudgmentinpartanddissenting in part); id., at 980 (opinion of Scalia, J.); Roe v.Wade,410U.S.113,177(1973)(Rehnquist,J.,dissenting);
Doev.Bolton,410U.S.179,222(1973)(White,J.,dissent-ing).
In sum, the Constitution is neutral on the issue of abor-tion and allows the people and their elected representativesto address the issue through the democratic process.In myrespectful view, the Court in Roe therefore erred by takingsidesontheissueofabortion.
II
The more difficult question in this case is stare decisis—thatis,whethertooverruletheRoedecision.
Theprinciple of stare decisis requires respect for the
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Court’sprecedentsandfortheaccumulatedwisdomofthejudgeswhohavepreviouslyaddressedthesameissue.Stare decisis is rooted in Article III of the Constitution andis fundamental to the American judicial system and to thestabilityofAmericanlaw.
Adherencetoprecedentisthenorm,andstaredecisisim-poses a high bar before this Court may overrule a prece-dent. This Court’s history shows, however, that stare deci-sisisnotabsolute,andindeedcannotbeabsolute.Otherwise, as the Court today explains, many long-since-overruled cases such as Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537(1896); Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905); Miners-ville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940); and Bow-ers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 (1986), would never havebeenoverruledandwouldstillbethelaw.
InhiscanonicalBurnetopinionin1932,JusticeBrandeisstated that in “cases involving the Federal Constitution,where correction through legislative action is practicallyimpossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier deci-sions.”Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393,406−407 (1932) (dissenting opinion).That description oftheCourt’spracticeremainsaccuratetoday.EverycurrentMember of this Court has voted to overrule precedent.Andover the last 100 years beginning with Chief Justice Taft’sappointment in 1921, every one of the 48 Justices appointedto this Court has voted to overrule precedent.Many ofthoseJusticeshavevotedtooverruleasubstantialnumberof very significant and longstanding precedents.See, e.g.,Obergefellv.Hodges,576U.S.644(2015)(overrulingBaker
v. Nelson); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954)(overrulingPlessyv.Ferguson);WestCoastHotelCo.
v.Parrish,300U.S.379(1937)(overrulingAdkinsv.Chil-dren’sHospitalofD.C.andineffectLochnerv.NewYork).Butthathistoryalonedoesnotanswerthecriticalques-tion: When precisely should the Court overrule an errone-ousconstitutionalprecedent? Thehistoryofstaredecisisin
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this Court establishes that a constitutional precedent maybe overruled only when (i) the prior decision is not justwrong,butisegregiouslywrong,(ii)thepriordecisionhascaused significant negative jurisprudential or real-worldconsequences, and (iii) overruling the prior decision wouldnotundulyupsetlegitimaterelianceinterests.SeeRamos
v. Louisiana, 590 U. S.,−(2020) (KAVANAUGH, J.,concurringinpart)(slipop.,at7−8).
Applying those factors, I agree with the Court today thatRoe should be overruled. The Court in Roe erroneously as-signed itself the authority to decide a critically importantmoralandpolicyissuethattheConstitutiondoesnotgrantthis Court the authority to decide.As Justice Byron Whitesuccinctlyexplained,Roewas“animprovidentandextrav-agant exercise of the power of judicial review” because“nothing in the language or history of the Constitution” sup-ports a constitutional right to abortion. Bolton, 410 U. S.,at221−222(dissentingopinion).
Of course, the fact that a precedent is wrong, even egre-giously wrong, does not alone mean that the precedentshould be overruled.But as the Court today explains, Roehas caused significant negative jurisprudential and real-worldconsequences.Bytakingsidesonadifficultandcon-tentious issue on which the Constitution is neutral, Roeoverreached and exceeded this Court’s constitutional au-thority; gravely distorted the Nation’s understanding ofthis Court’s proper constitutional role; and caused signifi-cant harm to what Roe itself recognized as the State’s “im-portantandlegitimateinterest”inprotectingfetallife.410
U. S., at 162.All of that explains why tens of millions ofAmericans—andthe26StatesthatexplicitlyasktheCourttooverruleRoe—donotacceptRoeeven49yearslater.UndertheCourt’slongstandingstaredecisisprinciples,Roe
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shouldbeoverruled.3
Butthestaredecisisanalysishereissomewhatmorecomplicated because of Casey.In 1992, 19 years after Roe,Casey acknowledged the continuing dispute over Roe.TheCourt sought to find common ground that would resolve theabortiondebateandendthenationalcontroversy.Aftercarefulandthoughtfulconsideration,theCaseypluralityreaffirmed a right to abortion through viability (about 24weeks), while also allowing somewhat more regulation ofabortionthanRoehadallowed.4
IhavedeepandunyieldingrespectfortheJusticeswhowrotetheCaseypluralityopinion.AndIrespecttheCaseyplurality’sgood-faithefforttolocatesomemiddlegroundorcompromisethatcouldresolve thiscontroversyforAmerica.Butashasbecomeincreasinglyevidentovertime,Casey’s
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3 I also agree with the Court’s conclusion today with respect to reliance.Broad notions of societal reliance have been invoked in support of Roe,but the Court has not analyzed reliance in that way in the past.Forexample, American businesses and workers relied on Lochner v. NewYork,198U.S.45(1905),andAdkinsv.Children’sHospitalofD.C.,261
U. S. 525 (1923), to construct a laissez-faire economy that was free ofsubstantial regulation.In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379(1937), the Court nonetheless overruled Adkins and in effect Lochner.An entire region of the country relied on Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S.537(1896),toenforceasystemofracialsegregation.InBrownv.Boardof Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), the Court overruled Plessy.Much ofAmericansocietywasbuiltaroundthetraditionalviewofmarriagethatwas upheld in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810 (1972), and that was re-flected in laws ranging from tax laws to estate laws to family laws.InObergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015), the Court nonetheless over-ruledBaker.
4AstheCourttodaynotes,Casey’sapproachtostaredecisispointedin
two directions.Casey reaffirmed Roe’s viability line, but it expresslyoverruled the Roe trimester framework and also expressly overruled twolandmarkpost-Roeabortioncases—Akronv.AkronCenterforReproduc-tive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416 (1983), and Thornburgh v. American Col-lege of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747 (1986).See Casey,505U.S.,at870,872−873,878−879,882.Caseyitselfthusdirectlycon-tradictsanynotionofabsolutestaredecisis inabortioncases.
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well-intentioned effort did not resolve the abortion debate.The national division has not ended.In recent years, a sig-nificantnumberofStateshaveenactedabortion re-strictions that directly conflict with Roe.Those laws cannotbe dismissed as political stunts or as outlier laws.Thosenumerous state laws collectively represent the sincere anddeeply held views of tens of millions of Americans who con-tinue to fervently believe that allowing abortions up to 24weeks is far too radical and far too extreme, and does notsufficientlyaccountforwhatRoeitselfrecognizedastheState’s “important and legitimate interest” in protecting fe-tal life. 410 U. S., at 162. In this case, moreover, a majorityof the States—26 in all—ask the Court to overrule Roe andreturntheabortionissuetotheStates.
In short, Casey’s stare decisisanalysis rested in part on a
predictive judgment about the future development of statelaws and of the people’s views on the abortion issue. Butthat predictive judgment has not borne out.As the Courttoday explains, the experience over the last 30 years con-flicts with Casey’s predictive judgment and therefore under-minesCasey’sprecedentialforce.5
In any event, although Casey is relevant to the stare de-cisis analysis, the question of whether to overrule Roe can-not be dictated by Casey alone.To illustrate that stare de-cisis point, consider an example.Suppose that in 1924 thisCourt had expressly reaffirmed Plessy v. Ferguson and up-heldtheStates’authoritytosegregatepeopleonthebasisofrace.WouldtheCourtinBrownsome30yearslaterin
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5 To be clear, public opposition to a prior decision is not a basis for over-ruling (or reaffirming) that decision.Rather, the question of whether tooverruleaprecedentmustbeanalyzedunderthis Court’s traditionalstare decisis factors.The only point here is that Casey adopted a specialstare decisis principle with respect to Roe based on the idea of resolvingthe national controversy and ending the national division over abortion.The continued and significant opposition to Roe, as reflected in the lawsand positionsofnumerousStates,isrelevant to assessingCasey on itsownterms.
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1954 have reaffirmed Plessy and upheld racially segregatedschools simply because of that intervening 1924 precedent?Surelytheanswerisno.
In sum, I agree with the Court’s application today of theprinciples of stare decisis and its conclusion that Roe shouldbeoverruled.
III
Aftertoday’sdecision,thenineMembers of this Courtwill no longer decide the basic legality of pre-viability abor-tion for all 330 million Americans.That issue will be re-solved by the people and their representatives in the demo-craticprocessintheStatesorCongress.Buttheparties’argumentshaveraisedotherrelatedquestions,andIad-dresssomeofthemhere.
Firstisthequestionofhowthisdecisionwillaffectotherprecedents involving issues such as contraception and mar-riage—in particular, the decisions in Griswold v. Connecti-cut,381U.S.479(1965);Eisenstadtv.Baird,405U.S.438
(1972);Lovingv.Virginia,388U.S.1(1967);andOberge-fell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015).I emphasize what theCourt today states: Overruling Roe does not mean the over-rulingofthoseprecedents,anddoesnotthreatenorcastdoubtonthoseprecedents.
Second, as I see it, some of the other abortion-related le-gal questions raised by today’s decision are not especiallydifficultasaconstitutionalmatter. For example, may aState bar a resident of that State from traveling to anotherState to obtain an abortion?In my view, the answer is nobasedontheconstitutionalrighttointerstatetravel. Maya State retroactively impose liability or punishment for anabortion that occurred before today’s decision takes effect?Inmyview,theanswerisnobasedontheDueProcessClauseortheExPostFactoClause.Cf.Bouiev.CityofColumbia,378U.S.347(1964).
Otherabortion-relatedlegalquestionsmayemergeinthe
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KAVANAUGH,J.,concurring
future. But this Court will no longer decide the fundamen-tal question of whether abortion must be allowed through-out the United States through 6 weeks, or 12 weeks, or 15weeks, or 24 weeks, or some other line.The Court will nolonger decide how to evaluate the interests of the pregnantwoman and the interests in protecting fetal life throughoutpregnancy.Instead, those difficult moral and policy ques-tionswillbedecided,astheConstitutiondictates,bythepeople and their elected representatives through the consti-tutionalprocessesofdemocraticself-government.
* * *
The Roe Court took sides on a consequential moral andpolicyissuethatthisCourthadnoconstitutionalauthorityto decide.By taking sides, the Roe Court distorted the Na-tion’s understanding of this Court’s proper role in the Amer-icanconstitutionalsystemandtherebydamagedtheCourtasaninstitution.AsJusticeScaliaexplained,Roe“de-stroyed the compromises of the past, rendered compromiseimpossible for the future, and required the entire issue toberesolveduniformly,atthenationallevel.”Casey,505
U. S., at 995 (opinion concurring in judgment in part anddissentinginpart).
TheCourt’sdecisiontodayproperlyreturnstheCourttoa position of judicial neutrality on the issue of abortion, andproperly restores the people’s authority to resolve the issueofabortionthroughtheprocessesofdemocraticself-governmentestablishedbytheConstitution.
Tobesure,manyAmericanswilldisagreewiththeCourt’s decision today.That would be true no matter howthe Court decided this case.Both sides on the abortion is-sue believe sincerely and passionately in the rightness oftheir cause.Especially in those difficult and fraught cir-cumstances, the Court must scrupulously adhere to theConstitution’sneutralpositionontheissueofabortion.
Since1973,morethan20JusticesofthisCourthavenow
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grappled with the divisive issue of abortion.I greatly re-spectalloftheJustices,pastandpresent,whohavedoneso.Amidst extraordinary controversy and challenges, all ofthem have addressed the abortion issue in good faith aftercareful deliberation, and based on their sincere understand-ings of the Constitution and of precedent.I have endeav-oredtodothesame.
Inmyjudgment,ontheissueof abortion,the Constitu-tion is neither pro-life nor pro-choice.The Constitution isneutral, and this Court likewise must be scrupulously neu-tral.TheCourttodayproperlyheedstheconstitutionalprinciple of judicial neutrality and returns the issue of abor-tion to the people and their elected representatives in thedemocraticprocess.
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ROBERTS,C.J.,concurringinjudgment SUPREMECOURTOFTHEUNITEDSTATESNo.19–1392
THOMASE.DOBBS,STATEHEALTHOFFICEROFTHEMISSISSIPPIDEPARTMENTOFHEALTH,ETAL.,PETITIONERSv.JACKSONWOMEN’S
HEALTHORGANIZATION,ETAL.
ONWRITOFCERTIORARITOTHEUNITEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALSFORTHEFIFTHCIRCUIT
[June24,2022]
CHIEFJUSTICEROBERTS,concurringinthejudgment.
We granted certiorari to decide one question: “Whetherall pre-viability prohibitions on elective abortions are un-constitutional.”Pet. for Cert. i.That question is directlyimplicated here: Mississippi’s Gestational Age Act, Miss.Code Ann. §41–41–191 (2018), generally prohibits abortionafter the fifteenth week of pregnancy—several weeks beforea fetus is regarded as “viable” outside the womb. In urgingour review, Mississippi stated that its case was “an idealvehicle” to “reconsider the bright-line viability rule,” andthatajudgmentinitsfavorwould“notrequiretheCourttooverturn” Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and PlannedParenthoodofSoutheasternPa.v.Casey,505U. S.833(1992).Pet.forCert.5.
Today,theCourtnonethelessrulesforMississippibydo-
ingjustthat.Iwouldtakeamoremeasuredcourse.IagreewiththeCourtthattheviabilitylineestablishedbyRoeandCasey should be discarded under a straightforward stare de-cisis analysis.That line never made any sense.Our abor-tion precedents describe the right at issue as a woman’sright to choose to terminate her pregnancy.That rightshouldthereforeextendfarenoughtoensureareasonableopportunitytochoose,butneednotextendanyfurther—
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certainly not all the way to viability.Mississippi’s law al-lowsawomanthreemonthstoobtainanabortion,wellbe-yondthepointatwhichitisconsidered“late”todiscoverapregnancy.See A. Ayoola, Late Recognition of UnintendedPregnancies, 32 Pub. Health Nursing 462 (2015) (preg-nancyisdiscoverableandordinarilydiscoveredbysixweeks of gestation).I see no sound basis for questioningtheadequacyofthatopportunity.
But that is all I would say, out of adherence to a simpleyet fundamental principle of judicial restraint: If it is notnecessary to decide more to dispose of a case, then it is nec-essarynottodecidemore.Perhapswearenotalwaysper-fect in following that command, and certainly there arecases that warrant an exception.But this is not one ofthem.Surely we should adhere closely to principles of judi-cialrestrainthere,wherethebroaderpaththeCourtchooses entails repudiating a constitutional right we havenot only previously recognized, but also expressly reaf-firmed applying the doctrine of stare decisis.The Court’sopinion is thoughtful and thorough, but those virtues can-not compensate for the fact that its dramatic and conse-quentialrulingisunnecessarytodecidethecasebeforeus.
I
Let me begin with my agreement with the Court, on theonly question we need decide here: whether to retain therule from Roe and Casey that a woman’s right to terminateher pregnancy extends up to the point that the fetus is re-garded as “viable” outside the womb.I agree that this ruleshouldbediscarded.
First, this Court seriously erred in Roe in adopting via-bility as the earliest point at which a State may legislate toadvance its substantial interests in the area of abortion.See ante, at 50–53.Roe set forth a rigid three-part frame-work anchored to viability, which more closely resembled aregulatorycodethanabodyofconstitutionallaw.That
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framework, moreover, came out of thin air.Neither theTexas statute challenged in Roe nor the Georgia statute atissue in its companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179(1973), included any gestational age limit.No party or ami-cus asked the Court to adopt a bright line viability rule.AndasforCasey,argumentsfororagainsttheviabilityruleplayedonlyademinimisroleintheparties’briefingandinthe oral argument.See Tr. of Oral Arg. 17–18, 51 (fleetingdiscussionoftheviabilityrule).
It is thus hardly surprising that neither Roe nor Caseymadeapersuasiveorevencolorableargumentforwhythetime for terminating a pregnancy must extend to viability.The Court’s jurisprudence on this issue is a textbook illus-tration of the perils of deciding a question neither presentednor briefed.As has been often noted, Roe’s defense of theline boiled down to the circular assertion that the State’sinterest is compelling only when an unborn child can liveoutside the womb, because that is when the unborn childcan live outside the womb.See 410 U. S., at 163–164; seealsoJ.Ely,TheWagesofCryingWolf:ACommentonRoe Wade, 82 Yale L. J. 920, 924 (1973) (Roe’s reasoning “mis-take[s]adefinitionforasyllogism”). Twentyyearslater,thebestdefenseoftheviabilitylinethe Casey plurality could conjure up was workability. See505 U. S., at 870.But see ante, at 53 (opinion of the Court)(discussingthedifficultiesinapplyingtheviabilitystand-ard).Although the plurality attempted to add more contentby opining that “it might be said that a woman who fails toact before viability has consented to the State’s interventionon behalf of the developing child,” Casey, 505 U. S., at 870,that mere suggestion provides no basis for choosing viabil-ity as the critical tipping point.A similar implied consentargumentcouldbemadewithrespecttoalawbanningabortionsafterfifteenweeks,wellbeyondthe point atwhichnearlyallwomenareawarethattheyarepregnant,
A.Ayoola,M.Nettleman,M.Stommel,&R.Canady,Time
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ROBERTS,C.J., concurring injudgment
of Pregnancy Recognition and Prenatal Care Use: A Popu-lation-basedStudyintheUnitedStates39(2010)(Preg-nancyRecognition).Thedissent,whichwouldretaintheviabilityline,offersnojustificationforiteither.
This Court’s jurisprudence since Casey, moreover, has“eroded” the “underpinnings” of the viability line, such asthey were.United States v. Gaudin,515 U. S. 506, 521(1995).The viability line is a relic of a time when we recog-nizedonlytwostateinterestswarrantingregulationofabortion:maternalhealthandprotectionof“potentiallife.”Roe, 410 U. S., at 162–163.That changed with Gonzales v.Carhart, 550 U. S. 124 (2007).There, we recognized abroader array of interests, such as drawing “a bright linethat clearly distinguishes abortion and infanticide,” main-taining societal ethics, and preserving the integrity of themedical profession.Id., at 157–160.The viability line hasnothing to do with advancing such permissible goals.Cf.id., at 171 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (Gonzales “blur[red]the line, firmly drawn in Casey, between previability andpostviability abortions”); see also R. Beck, Gonzales, Casey,and the Viability Rule, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 249, 276–279(2009).
Consider,forexample,statutespassedinanumberofju-
risdictions that forbid abortions after twenty weeks of preg-nancy, premised on the theory that a fetus can feel pain atthat stage of development.See, e.g., Ala. Code §26–23B–2(2018).Assuming that prevention of fetal pain is a legiti-mate state interest after Gonzales, there seems to be no rea-sonwhyviabilitywouldberelevanttothepermissibilityofsuch laws.The same is true of laws designed to “protect[]the integrity and ethics of the medical profession” and re-strictprocedureslikelyto“coarsensociety”tothe“dignityof human life.”Gonzales, 550 U. S., at 157.Mississippi’slaw, for instance, was premised in part on the legislature’sfinding that the “dilation and evacuation” procedure is a“barbaricpractice,dangerousforthematernalpatient,and
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ROBERTS,C.J., concurring injudgment
demeaning to the medical profession.” Miss. Code Ann.
§41–41–191(2)(b)(i)(8).That procedure accounts for mostabortionsperformedafterthefirsttrimester—twoweeksbeforetheperiodatissueinthiscase—and“involve[s]theuse of surgical instruments to crush and tear the unbornchild apart.”Ibid.; see also Gonzales, 550 U. S., at 135.Again,itwouldmakelittlesensetofocusonviabilitywhenevaluatingalawbasedonthesepermissiblegoals.
In short, the viability rule was created outside the ordi-nary course of litigation, is and always has been completelyunreasoned,andfailstotakeaccount of state interestssincerecognizedaslegitimate.Itis indeed “telling thatothercountriesalmostuniformlyeschew”aviabilityline.Ante, at 53 (opinion of the Court).Only a handful of coun-tries, among them China and North Korea, permit electiveabortionsaftertwentyweeks;theresthavecoalescedarounda12–weekline.SeeTheWorld’sAbortionLaws,CenterforReproductiveRights(Feb.23,2021)(onlinesourcearchived at www.supremecourt.gov) (Canada,China,Iceland,Guinea-Bissau,theNetherlands,NorthKo-rea, Singapore, and Vietnam permit elective abortions aftertwenty weeks).The Court rightly rejects the arbitrary via-bilityruletoday.
II
None of this, however, requires that we also take the dra-maticstepofaltogethereliminatingtheabortionrightfirstrecognized in Roe.Mississippi itself previously argued asmuchtothisCourtinthislitigation.
When the State petitioned for our review, its basic re-quest was straightforward: “clarify whether abortion prohi-bitions before viability are always unconstitutional.”Pet.forCert.14.TheStatemadeanumberofstrongargumentsthat the answer is no, id., at 15–26—arguments that, asdiscussed, I find persuasive.And it went out of its way tomakeclearthatitwasnotaskingtheCourttorepudiate
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entirely the right to choose whether to terminate a preg-nancy: “To be clear, the questions presented in this petitiondonotrequiretheCourttooverturnRoeorCasey.”Id.,at
5.Mississippitemperedthatstatementwithanobliqueone-sentencefootnoteintimatingthat,if the Court couldnotreconcileRoeandCaseywithcurrentfactsor othercases, it “should not retain erroneous precedent.”Pet. forCert. 5–6, n. 1.But the State never argued that we shouldgrantreviewforthatpurpose.
Afterwegrantedcertiorari,however,Mississippichangedcourse.Initsprincipalbrief,theStatebluntlyan-nounced that the Court should overrule Roe and Casey.TheConstitution does not protect a right to an abortion, it ar-gued, and a State should be able to prohibit elective abor-tions if a rational basis supports doing so. See Brief for Pe-titioners12–13.
The Court now rewards that gambit, noting three timesthat the parties presented “no half-measures” and arguedthat “we must either reaffirm or overrule Roe and Casey.”Ante, at 5, 8, 72.Given those two options, the majority picksthelatter.
This framing is not accurate.In its brief on the merits,Mississippi in fact argued at length that a decision simplyrejectingtheviabilityrulewouldresultinajudgmentinitsfavor.See Brief for Petitioners 5, 38–48.But even if theState had not argued as much, it would not matter.ThereisnorulethatpartiescanconfinethisCourttodisposingoftheir case on a particular ground—let alone when reviewwas sought and granted on a different one.Our establishedpracticeisinsteadnotto“formulatearuleofconstitutionallaw broader than is required by the precise facts to which itis to be applied.”Washington State Grange v. WashingtonState Republican Party, 552U.S.442,450(2008) (quoting
Ashwanderv.TVA,297U.S.288,347(1936)(Brandeis,J.,
concurring)); see also United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17,21(1960).
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Followingthat“fundamentalprincipleofjudicialre-straint,” Washington State Grange, 552 U. S., at 450, weshould begin with the narrowest basis for disposition, pro-ceeding to consider a broader one only if necessary to re-solve the case at hand.See, e.g., Office of Personnel Man-agement v. Richmond, 496 U. S. 414, 423 (1990).It is onlywhere there is no valid narrower ground of decision that weshouldgoontoaddressabroaderissue,suchaswhetheraconstitutional decision should be overturned.See FederalElection Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S.449,482(2007)(decliningtoaddresstheclaimthatacon-stitutional decision should be overruled when the appellantprevailedonits narrower constitutional argument).
Here,thereisaclearpathtodecidingthiscasecorrectly
without overruling Roe all the way down to the studs: rec-ognize that the viability line must be discarded, as the ma-jority rightly does, and leave for another day whether to re-jectanyrighttoanabortionatall.SeeWebsterv.ReproductiveHealthServices,492U. S.490,518,521(1989) (plurality opinion) (rejecting Roe’s viability line as“rigid” and “indeterminate,” while also finding “no occasionto revisit the holding of Roe” that, under the Constitution,aStatemustprovideanopportunitytochoosetoterminateapregnancy).
Ofcourse,suchanapproachwouldnotbeavailableiftherationaleofRoeandCaseywasinextricablyentangledwithand dependent upon the viability standard.It is not.Ourprecedentsinthisareagroundtheabortionrightinawoman’s “right to choose.”See Carey v. Population ServicesInt’l, 431 U. S. 678, 688–689 (1977) (“underlying foundationoftheholdings”inRoeandGriswoldv.Connecticut,381
U. S. 479 (1965), was the “right of decision in matters ofchildbearing”); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 473 (1977) (Roeandothercases“recognizeaconstitutionallyprotectedin-terest in making certain kinds of important decisions freefromgovernmentalcompulsion”(internalquotationmarks
8 DOBBSv. JACKSONWOMEN’SHEALTH ORGANIZATION
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omitted));id.,at473–474(Roe“didnotdeclareanunquali-fied constitutional right to an abortion,” but instead pro-tected“thewomanfromundulyburdensome interferencewith her freedom to decide whether to terminate her preg-nancy”(internalquotationmarksomitted));Webster,492
U.S.,at520(pluralityopinion)(Roeprotects“theclaimsofa woman to decide for herself whether or not to abort a fetusshe [is] carrying”); Gonzales, 550 U. S., at 146 (a State maynot “prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decisionto terminate her pregnancy”).If that is the basis for Roe,Roe’s viability line should be scrutinized from the same per-spective.Andthereisnothinginherentinthe right tochoose that requires it to extend to viability or any otherpoint,solongasarealchoiceisprovided. SeeWebster,492
U.S.,at519(pluralityopinion)(findingnoreason“whytheState’s interest in protecting potential human life shouldcomeinto existence onlyat the point ofviability”).
To be sure, in reaffirming the right to an abortion, Caseytermed the viability rule Roe’s “central holding.”505 U. S.,at 860.Other cases of ours have repeated that language.See, e.g., Gonzales, 550 U. S., at 145–146.But simply de-claring it does not make it so.The question in Roe waswhether there was any right to abortion in the Constitu-tion.See Brief for Appellants and Brief for Appellees, inRoe v. Wade, O. T. 1971, No. 70–18.How far the right ex-tended was a concern that was separate and subsidiary,and—notsurprisingly—entirelyunbriefed.
The Court in Roe just chose to address both issues in oneopinion:Itfirstrecognizedarightto“choosetoterminate
[a] pregnancy” under the Constitution, see 410 U. S., at129–159, and then, having done so, explained that a lineshould be drawn at viability such that a State could not pro-scribe abortion before that period, see id., at 163.The via-bility line is a separate rule fleshing out the metes andbounds of Roe’s core holding.Applying principles of staredecisis,Iwouldexcisethatadditionalrule—andonlythat
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ROBERTS,C.J., concurring injudgment
rule—fromourjurisprudence.
The majority lists a number of cases that have stressedthe importance of the viability rule to our abortion prece-dents.See ante, at 73–74.I agree that—whether it wasoriginally holding or dictum—the viability line is clearlypartofour“pastprecedent,”andtheCourthasapplieditassuch in several cases since Roe.Ante, at 73.My point isthat Roe adopted two distinct rules of constitutional law:one, that a woman has the right to choose to terminate apregnancy; two, that such right may be overridden by theState’slegitimateinterestswhenthefetusisviableoutsidethewomb.Thelatterisobviouslydistinctfromtheformer.I would abandon that timing rule, but see no need in thiscasetoconsiderthebasicright.
TheCourtcontendsthatitisimpossibletoaddressRoe’s
conclusion that the Constitution protects the woman’s rightto abortion, without also addressing Roe’s rule that theState’sinterestsarenotconstitutionallyadequatetojustifya ban on abortion until viability.See ibid.But we havepartiallyoverruledprecedentsbefore,see,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Miller,471U.S.130,142–144(1985);Danielsv.
Williams,474U. S.327,328–331(1986);Batsonv.Ken-
tucky,476U.S.79,90–93(1986),andcertainlyhaveneverheld that a distinct holding defining the contours of a con-stitutional right must be treated as part and parcel of therightitself.
Overruling the subsidiary rule is sufficient to resolve thiscase in Mississippi’s favor.The law at issue allows abor-tions up through fifteen weeks, providing an adequate op-portunity to exercise the right Roe protects.By the time apregnant woman has reached that point, her pregnancy iswell into the second trimester.Pregnancy tests are now in-expensiveandaccurate,andawomanordinarilydiscoversshe is pregnant by six weeks of gestation. See A. Branum& K. Ahrens, Trends in Timing of Pregnancy AwarenessAmongUS Women,21Maternal&ChildHealthJ.715,722
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(2017).Almost all know by the end of the first trimester.PregnancyRecognition39.Safeandeffectiveabortifa-cients, moreover, are now readily available, particularlyduring those early stages.See I. Adibi et al., Abortion, 22Geo. J. Gender & L. 279, 303 (2021).Given all this, it is nosurprise that the vast majority of abortions happen in thefirst trimester.See Centers for Disease Control and Pre-vention, Abortion Surveillance—United States 1 (2020).Presumably most of the remainder would also take placeearlieriflaterabortionswerenotalegaloption.Ampleev-idence thus suggests that a 15-week ban provides sufficienttime, absent rare circumstances, for a woman “to decide forherself”whethertoterminateherpregnancy.Webster,492
U.S.,at520(pluralityopinion).*
III
Whether a precedent should be overruled is a question“entirelywithinthediscretionofthecourt.”Hertzv.Wood-man,218U.S.205,212(1910);seealsoPaynev.Tennessee,
501 U. S. 808, 828 (1991) (stare decisis is a “principle of pol-icy”).In my respectful view, the sound exercise of that dis-cretion should have led the Court to resolve the case on thenarrower grounds set forth above, rather than overrulingRoe and Casey entirely.The Court says there is no “princi-pled basis” for this approach, ante, at 73, but in fact it isfirmly grounded in basic principles of stare decisis and judi-cialrestraint.
——————
*The majority contends that “nothing like [my approach] was recom-mendedbyeitherparty.”Ante,at72.Butasexplained,Mississippiinfact pressedasimilar argument in its filings before this Court.See Pet.for Cert. 15–26; Brief for Petitioners 5, 38–48 (urging the Court to rejectthe viability rule and reverse); Reply Brief 20–22 (same).The approachalso finds support in prior opinions.See Webster, 492 U. S., at 518–521(plurality opinion) (abandoning “key elements” of the Roe framework un-der stare decisis while declining to reconsider Roe’s holding that the Con-stitutionprotectstherighttoanabortion).
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ROBERTS,C.J., concurring injudgment
The Court’s decision to overrule Roe and Casey is a seri-ousjoltto thelegalsystem—regardlessofhowyouviewthose cases.A narrower decision rejecting the misguidedviability line would be markedly less unsettling, and noth-ingmoreisneededtodecidethiscase.
Ourcasessaythattheeffectofoverrulingaprecedentonreliance interests is a factor to consider in deciding whetherto take such a step, and respondents argue that generationsof women have relied on the right to an abortion in organ-izing their relationships and planning their futures.Brieffor Respondents 36–41; see also Casey, 505 U. S., at 856(making the same point).The Court questions whetherthese concerns are pertinent under our precedents, seeante, at 64–65, but the issue would not even arise with adecisionrejectingonlytheviabilityline:Itcannotreasona-bly be argued that women have shaped their lives in parton the assumption that they would be able to abort up toviability,asopposedtofifteenweeks.
Insupportofitsholding,theCourtcitesthreeseminal
constitutional decisions that involved overruling prior prec-edents: Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954),West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943),and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937).See ante, at 40–41.The opinion in Brown was unanimousand eleven pages long; this one is neither.Barnette wasdecided only three years after the decision it overruled,threeJusticeshavinghadsecondthoughts.AndWestCoastHotel was issued against a backdrop of unprecedented eco-nomic despair that focused attention on the fundamentalflawsofexistingprecedent.ItalsowaspartofaseachangeinthisCourt’sinterpretationoftheConstitution,“sig-nal[ing] the demise of an entire line of important prece-dents,”ante,at40—afeaturetheCourtexpresslydisclaimsin today’s decision, see ante, at 32, 66.None of these lead-ing cases, in short, provides a template for what the Courtdoestoday.
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The Court says we should consider whether to overruleRoe and Casey now, because if we delay we would be forcedtoconsidertheissueagaininshortorder.Seeante,at76–
77. There would be “turmoil” until we did so, according totheCourt,becauseofexistingstatelawswith“shorterdeadlines or no deadline at all.” Ante, at 76. But under thenarrower approach proposed here, state laws outlawingabortion altogether would still violate binding precedent.And to the extent States have laws that set the cutoff dateearlierthanfifteenweeks,anylitigationoverthattimeframe would proceed free of the distorting effect thattheviabilityrulehashadonourconstitutionaldebate.Thesamecouldbetrue,forthatmatter,withrespecttolegisla-tive consideration in the States.We would then be free toexercise our discretion in deciding whether and when totakeup the issue,fromamoreinformedperspective.
* * *
BoththeCourt’sopinionandthedissentdisplayarelent-less freedom from doubt on the legal issue that I cannotshare.I am not sure, for example, that a ban on terminat-ing a pregnancy from the moment of conception must betreated the same under the Constitution as a ban after fif-teen weeks. A thoughtful Member of this Court once coun-seledthatthedifficultyofaquestion“admonishesustoob-serve the wise limitations on our function and to confineourselves to deciding only what is necessary to the disposi-tion of the immediate case.”Whitehouse v. Illinois CentralR.Co.,349U.S.366,372–373(1955)(Frankfurter,J.,for
the Court). I would decide the question we granted reviewtoanswer—whetherthepreviouslyrecognizedabortionrightbarsallabortionrestrictionspriortoviability, suchthat a ban on abortions after fifteen weeks of pregnancy isnecessarilyunlawful.Theanswerto that question is no,andthereisnoneedtogofurthertodecidethiscase.
Ithereforeconcuronlyinthejudgment.
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BREYER,SOTOMAYOR,andKAGAN,JJ.,dissenting SUPREMECOURTOFTHEUNITEDSTATESNo.19–1392
THOMASE.DOBBS,STATEHEALTHOFFICEROFTHEMISSISSIPPIDEPARTMENTOFHEALTH,ETAL.,PETITIONERSv.JACKSONWOMEN’S
HEALTHORGANIZATION,ETAL.
ONWRITOFCERTIORARITOTHEUNITEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALSFORTHEFIFTHCIRCUIT
[June24,2022]
JUSTICEBREYER, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE
KAGAN,dissenting.
Forhalfacentury,Roev.Wade,410U.S.113(1973),andPlanned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S.833(1992),haveprotectedthelibertyandequalityofwomen.Roe held, and Casey reaffirmed, that the Constitu-tionsafeguardsawoman’srighttodecideforherselfwhether to bear a child.Roe held, and Casey reaffirmed,thatinthefirststagesofpregnancy,thegovernmentcouldnot make that choice for women.The government could notcontrol a woman’s body or the course of a woman’s life: Itcould not determine what the woman’s future would be.SeeCasey, 505 U. S., at 853; Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U. S. 124,171–172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).Respecting awomanasanautonomousbeing,andgrantingherfullequality, meant giving her substantial choice over this mostpersonalandmostconsequential ofalllife decisions.
RoeandCaseywellunderstoodthedifficultyanddivisive-
nessoftheabortionissue.TheCourtknewthatAmericanshold profoundly different views about the “moral[ity]” of“terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest stage.”Ca-sey,505U.S.,at850. AndtheCourtrecognizedthat“the
2 DOBBSv. JACKSON WOMEN’SHEALTH ORGANIZATION
BREYER,SOTOMAYOR,andKAGAN,JJ.,dissenting
State has legitimate interests from the outset of the preg-nancyinprotecting”the“lifeofthefetusthatmaybecomeachild.”Id.,at846.SotheCourt struck a balance, as itoften does when values and goals compete.It held that theStatecouldprohibitabortionsafterfetalviability,solongas the ban contained exceptions to safeguard a woman’s lifeor health.It held that even before viability, the State couldregulate the abortion procedure in multiple and meaningfulways.Butuntiltheviabilitylinewas crossed, the Courtheld, a State could not impose a “substantial obstacle” on awoman’s “right to elect the procedure” as she (not the gov-ernment) thought proper, in light of all the circumstancesandcomplexitiesofherownlife.Ibid.
Today,theCourtdiscardsthatbalance.Itsaysthatfrom
the very moment of fertilization, a woman has no rights tospeak of.A State can force her to bring a pregnancy to term,even at the steepest personal and familial costs. An abor-tion restriction, the majority holds, is permissible wheneverrational, the lowest level of scrutiny known to the law.Andbecause,astheCourthasoftenstated,protectingfetallifeis rational, States will feel free to enact all manner of re-strictions.The Mississippi law at issue here bars abortionsafter the 15th week of pregnancy.Under the majority’s rul-ing, though, another State’s law could do so after ten weeks,or five or three or one—or, again, from the moment of ferti-lization.States have already passed such laws, in anticipa-tion of today’s ruling.More will follow.Some States haveenacted laws extending to all forms of abortion procedure,including taking medication in one’s own home.They havepassed laws without any exceptions for when the woman isthevictimofrapeorincest.Underthoselaws,awomanwill have to bear her rapist’s child or a young girl her fa-ther’s—no matter if doing so will destroy her life.So too,aftertoday’sruling,someStatesmaycompelwomen tocarry to term a fetus with severe physical anomalies—forexample,oneafflictedwithTay-Sachsdisease,suretodie
Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 3
BREYER,SOTOMAYOR,andKAGAN,JJ.,dissenting
within a few years of birth.States may even argue that aprohibition on abortion need make no provision for protect-ing a woman from risk of death or physical harm. Across avast array of circumstances, a State will be able to imposeitsmoralchoiceonawomanandcoercehertogivebirthtoachild.
Enforcement of all these draconian restrictions will alsobe left largely to the States’ devices.A State can of courseimpose criminal penalties on abortion providers, includinglengthy prison sentences.But some States will not stopthere. Perhaps, in the wake of today’s decision, a state lawwill criminalize the woman’s conduct too, incarcerating orfining her for daring to seek or obtain an abortion.And asTexashasrecentlyshown,aStatecanturnneighboragainst neighbor, enlisting fellow citizens in the effort toroot out anyone who tries to get an abortion, or to assistanotherindoingso.
Themajority triestohide thegeographicallyexpansiveeffects of its holding.Today’s decision, the majority says,permits “each State” to address abortion as it pleases. Ante,at 79.That is cold comfort, of course, for the poor womanwho cannot get the money to fly to a distant State for a pro-cedure.Aboveallothers,womenlackingfinancial re-sources will suffer from today’s decision.In any event, in-terstaterestrictionswillalsosoonbein the offing. Afterthis decision, some States may block women from travelingout of State to obtain abortions, or even from receiving abor-tion medications from out of State.Some may criminalizeefforts, including the provision of information or funding, tohelp women gain access to other States’ abortion services.Mostthreateningofall,nolanguagein today’s decisionstopstheFederalGovernmentfromprohibitingabortionsnationwide, once again from the moment of conception andwithout exceptions for rape or incest.If that happens, “theviewsof[anindividualState’s]citizens”willnot matter.Ante,at1.Thechallengeforawomanwillbetofinancea
